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This study investigates the privatization of the telecommunications sector in Argentina
and Brazil, in the late 1980s and late1990s, respectively. My hypothesis is that Brazil succeeded
in achieving a better outcome in its privatization than Argentina because the Brazilian
government succeeded in establishing a stable institutional environment during the privatization
process, therefore heightening its credibility with investors and its bargaining power. The
hypothesis lays on a causal relationship, which, I argue, starts with the institutional design of the
privatization. The institutional design will influence foreign investors’ perception of the
credibility of the state, which, in turn, may potentially enhance the bargaining power of the state.
The hypothesis was assessed based on an analysis of the historical narrative of the two
transactions. From this historical analysis I inferred indications of each country’s bargaining
power, primarily based on the stability and quality of the institutional reform carried out by the
each government. In addition, premiums, the length of the exclusivity rights periods and
performance targets were established to measure the state’s bargaining power.
This study borrows the conceptual framework provided by New Institutional Economics
(NIE) to analyze the impact that a country’s institutional environment has on policy making and
business climate. According to the NIE approach, investors will most likely invest in countries
where there is a favorable perception of the strength and reliability of institutions; conversely, an
unstable institutional environment will lead investors to bargain with the state in order to lower
prices and curtail competition. Institutional instability may negatively influence the net results of
privatization, by either prompting investors to pay less and/or by simply transferring a monopoly
from the state to the hands of private owners.
I found that the Argentine and Brazilian cases differed markedly both in terms of the
institutional environment and net results of their respective privatizations. The institutional
environment in Argentina was more unstable than in Brazil and that negatively affected
Argentina’s perceived credibility and its bargaining power. Following the hypothesis’
proposition, Brazil yielded a much higher premium during the sale, while establishing a more
competitive market following the privatization. However, I also found that the historical context
has a remarkable influence on the policies chosen by each government. It appears that, in
developing countries, the design and outcome of economic policies, such privatization, is
determined more by the historical context than by pure economic rationale and business
expertise (an assessment that, in fact, echoes some of NIE’s main claims).
It appears that there is a strong causal relationship linking the quality of the institutional
environment, and the perceived credibility and bargaining power of the state. Most definitely,
however, the main lesson to be taken from this study is that, in Latin America, a fair assessment
of privatization cannot be complete without bringing the historical context into the scope of
analysis. Congruent with the main claim by NIE scholars, issues such as political turmoil,
economic instability, and other historical conditions surrounding the privatization process, are
crucial to the understanding of the institutional choices made by the privatizing state, and
consequently, to the results of privatization as a macroeconomic policy.
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INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the privatization of the telecommunications sector in two Latin
American countries: Argentina and Brazil. The historical period under investigation ranges from
the late 1980s, the years during which the Argentine privatization was implemented, to the late
1990s, when the Brazilian privatization occurred. The main purpose of this study is to assess
how the institutional design of each transaction influenced the bargaining power of the state
while negotiating with international investors. I argue that the net gains of privatization to
society at large depended on the state’s bargaining power during negotiations with investors.
The bargaining power of the state may be enhanced by the implementation of an institutional
environment that maximizes investors’ perception of the stability of institutions and the
credibility of the state. This hypothesis is analyzed using the conceptual framework provided by
the New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE is a useful analytical tool for this project because it
considers the historical context as one of the determinants of economic performance.
Furthermore, NIE offers concepts that illustrate the role of institutions in shaping business
decision-making and a country’s investment climate.
Telecommunications services in Argentina in the late 1980s were substandard, to say the
least. Telephone network connections relied on outdated equipment. In 1989, 46 percent of the
telephone lines were out of service and, because the maintenance crews at the Empresa Nacional
de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) were shrinking, it took at least eleven days to have them fixed.
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Ironically, while maintenance workers were dismissed at a rate of more than 40 percent over the
course of the decade, executive hiring rose by 35 percent.1
The situation of the Brazilian telecommunications sector was equally discouraging in the
1990s. Consumers formed lines outside soccer stadiums, hoping for a chance to be placed on a
waiting list to become eligible to buy residential telephone lines. Under the purchase contract,
consumers would pay US$1,200 for a single residential telephone line and wait at least two years
to have it installed.2 In 1994, there were 8.6 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in Brazil; a
cellular phone sold for some US$25,000 (the contract sold for about US$22,000 and the phone
itself for US$3,000).3 Owning a telephone line was an emblem of socio-economic status. For
the middle class, a regular telephone represented a lifelong investment, only equated with the
almost unattainable prospect of buying a house.
Two characteristics link these two privatizations, although they stand a decade apart: both
ENTEL and Telebrás were state-owned companies, representing the state’s monopoly over basic
telecommunications services, and were sold to help reach their respective countries achieve
macroeconomic stability.
A wave of privatizations swept through Latin America in the late 1980s-1990s. These
privatizations were part of a set of liberal adjustments prescribed by the international financial
community in light of severe fiscal imbalances and external debt most Latin American countries
were experiencing. Privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appeared challenging
politically, but an eminent necessity, after all. It seemed to be the only means available for
1 Ben Petrazzini, “Privatization in a Hurry,” in Ravi Ramamurti, Privatizing Monopolies. (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 116.
2 To give the reader a standard for comparison, the minimum wage in Brazil was less than US$100/month
at that time.
3 Renato Navarro Guerreiro, “Mensagem do Presidente: Acima de Tudo, Resultados” (President’s
Message: Above All, Results), Revista da Anatel, 31 de outubro de 2001. Retrieved March 31, 2005 from
Anatel’s webpage www.anatel.gov.br, 16 [translation mine].
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financially failed states to receive massive inflows of foreign capital needed to reach
macroeconomic balance. It also signaled to foreign investors that the once highly interventionist
Latin American states were willing to liberalize their markets by letting private owners operate
important infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications. This study, however, departs from
the somewhat more common assessment of whether governments should have engaged in
privatization or not. Instead, it describes two of the most important privatization projects in
Latin America, and it assesses how the choices of institutional design influenced the outcomes of
these privatizations.
Argentina privatized its state-owned telecommunications firm, ENTEL, in 1990, as part
of an emergency economic package aimed at attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) and to
help reduce its external debt. President Carlos S. Menem put the privatization program in place
during his first few months in office. Menem assembled a group of experts and gave them
fourteen months to develop a complex privatization plan for ENTEL. The privatization plan
divided ENTEL geographically into two companies: one to explore the northern and the other the
southern regions of the country; the greater Buenos Aires area was to be divided between the two
companies. From an initial pool of fourteen, the Argentine government ultimately found itself
left with only two buyers just before the date the sale was set to occur. The rate at which
potential bidders dropped out of the process was unusually high in Argentina. As it will be
discussed in more detail below, this may be attributed to the instability of institutions during the
privatization process. It will be argued, thus, that the institutional instability in Argentina
reduced the country’s credibility before international investors and, consequently, its bargaining
power during the privatization.
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The Brazilian government’s plan to privatize Telebrás was also driven by a
macroeconomic agenda and, as much as the Argentine program, it included the desire to attract
FDI to help cover public deficit. However, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso
began implementing an institutional reform in the telecom sector early in his first term, in 1995,
and privatized a few months before his re-election, in 1998. Several consortiums of foreign
investors participated in the Telebrás auction on July 29, 1998. Differently from the Argentine
case, the Brazilian government received much more than it expected for Telebrás.4
One of the distinguishing features of the Telebrás privatization was the set of reforms the
state was able to implement before the privatization. One such reform was the drafting, prior to
the privatization, of a comprehensive new law to govern the telecommunications sector and the
creation of a regulatory agency, the Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações, Anatel (National
Telecommunications Agency). It will be argued that investors perceived the Brazilian process to
be more stable and transparent; this perception enhanced the government’s credibility, and,
therefore, its bargaining power.
The focus here is the perception of investors with respect to the state’s credibility, and the
effect of such perception on the state’s bargaining power. It is important to highlight that
perception does not necessarily reflect reality. In other words, the question is not whether the
Brazilian government was in fact, more credible than the Argentine; the question is how and why
the privatization process in Brazil was perceived to be more credible and stable by the
international investor community.
The decision to focus on the history of telecommunications reform is twofold. First,
telecommunications is a pivotal industry in Latin America, both in terms of its size and role in
4 Argentina attained a premium of 27.36%; Brazil’s premium for Telesp, the largest subsidiary being sold,
was 64.04%. Please refer to Table 3Table 3 and Table 4Table 4 for further details regarding the proceeds




enabling economic development and democracy. Investments in the telecommunications
industry are expected to be US$2,299 million by 2008 in Argentina, and US$2,578 million in
Brazil.5 In 2005-06, Argentina was one of the fastest growing telecommunications markets in
Latin America; Brazil, on the other hand, is the largest information technology (IT) market in
Latin America today (Figure 1Figure 1 shows a pie chart that illustrates the magnitude of the
industry in Latin America).
Figure 1: IT market in Latin America
[Insert Figure 1: IT market in Latin America here]
The enhancement of telecommunication has the potential to positively impact a country’s
ability to quicken economic development by enabling entrepreneurs to connect with one another,
and with the global markets. Furthermore, improving telecommunications can potentially
strengthen democracy. Democracy is reinforced by telecommunications because it facilitates
citizens’ engagement in civic life.6 UNESCO's World Communication and Information Report
of 1999-2000 states that an enhanced telecommunications infrastructure is desirable to promote
democracy because it enables the emergence of what is called “teledemocracy” or, “…the
adaptation of Internet-based information tools by government, business, and civil society to
create an advanced participatory form of democracy.”7 Thus, an improved telecommunications
infrastructure may, in fact, facilitate democratic transition and/or consolidation. Finally, since
5 Source: Pyramid Research; Economist Intelligence Unit (retrieved from Business Source Premier,
March 2006).
6 The concept of teledemocracy has been embraced by the United Nations as one of the social goals
globalization. Please see UNESCO's World Communication and Information Report 1999-2000,
November 11, 1999. The report may be accessed at:
www.unesco.org/webworld/wcir/en/pdf_boxes/boxes.pdf.
7 For more information on the impact that enhanced telecommunications infrastructure has on democracy,
please visit Unesco’s World Communication and Information Report 1999-2000 at
www.unesco.org/webworld/wcir/en/pdf_boxes/boxes.pdf. The definition cited on this paper was retrieved




Brazil and Argentina were experiencing very different historical circumstances, a comparison
between them is appropriate to highlight the influence of history in shaping the design and
outcomes of economic policies.
This paper is divided into five chapters after this Introduction. Chapter I discusses the
general hypothesis of the paper, and provides a summary of certain NIE concepts that are
relevant to the cases under investigation; Chapter II presents an overview of the recent economic
history of Latin America; Chapters III and IV describe the Argentine and Brazilian cases,
respectively. The concluding chapter assesses the validity of this paper’s hypothesis and the
lessons learned from these case studies. The conclusion also comments on the relevance of New
Institutional Economics to the study of economic development in Latin America.
CHAPTER I – HYPOTHESIS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The objective of this study is to investigate the influence of institutional reform in the
state’s bargaining power during the privatization of the telecommunications sectors in Argentina
and Brazil. The central question motivating this study concerns not why the telecommunications
firms were privatized, but rather how the institutional environment influenced the outcomes of
privatization. The pivotal difference between the two cases under investigation was the ways in
which the governments of Argentina and Brazil carried out their respective institutional reforms:
for instance, while Brazil succeeded in framing its regulatory landscape prior to the sale,
Argentina did not; while in Brazil the process was perceived as stable, in Argentina the rules
were constantly changing and often the government did not comply with its own rules.
The main goals of these privatizations were to attract inflows of FDI and liberalize their
telecom markets (i.e.: open competition and promote investments). Thus, this investigation
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focuses on the relationship between how successful each government was in achieving these
goals and the institutional design implemented during the privatization process. To the
privatizing state, achieving both these goals is an optimal outcome. Under the investors’
perspective, however, these goals are seemingly conflicting. That is, higher competition after
privatization will curb investors’ willingness to pay more for the companies. More often than
not we see developing countries settling for less than favorable deals with foreign investors
simply because they have low bargaining power. With these two opposing interests under
negotiation, the dilemma for the privatizing state is to maximize its bargaining power so a
satisfactory settlement may be achieved.
My hypothesis derives from the following assertion: the Brazilian government enjoyed
greater bargaining power during negotiations because investors had a more positive perception
concerning the credibility and predictability of its institutions than they did in Argentina.
Conversely, Argentina could have attained a greater bargaining power, and therefore, enhanced
the net results of privatization, had it emphasized institutional stability as a means to heighten its
credibility. Perhaps this assertion is better explained through a hypothetical diagram – please
refer to Figure 2: Hypothetical schemeFigure 2: Hypothetical scheme for a schematic overview
of the hypothesis.
The first issue in assessing this hypothesis is how to measure the state’s bargaining
power. Since this study is, essentially, a historical one, the focus will be on the investigation of
how the transactions unfolded, and what indications of the state’s bargaining power can be
inferred from this historical account. From the historical account of the two transactions, special
attention will be paid to the stability and quality of the institutional reform carried out by the
government. For instance, a consensus exists about the idea that a strong and autonomous
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regulatory body should be created prior to the divestiture.8 This increases the possibility that the
newly created institutions (i.e.: laws, antitrust regulations, etc) will be respected, favoring a
healthy investment climate.9 Moreover, an effective regulator demonstrates the state’s
commitment to the new market structure, and this commitment, in turn, heightens investors’
perception that their property rights will be protected after privatization.10
Since measurable variables are always desirable, the following elements will serve as
measures of the state’s bargaining power: high premiums paid at the time of sale, and the
characteristics of the competitive landscape agreed upon with investors. In this study, the
competitive landscape will be analyzed based on measures such as the length of the exclusivity
period granted by the government, interconnection requirements, and service performance
targets.
Premium, in this context, equals the difference between the minimum price established
by the government to sell the company and the price the winning bidders actually paid. Thus,
the higher the premium the government was able to obtain, the higher the state’s bargaining
power will be deemed to be.
8 “Organizations” include political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory
agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies (churches,
clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training centers).
Douglass C. North. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 5.
9 John Hariss, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis. The New Institutional Economics and Third World
Development. (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 25. See also Samuel P. Huntington. Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chapter “Political Order and Political
Decay,” for a discussion on the institutionalization of political organizations.
10 This is particularly relevant in Latin America given its long history of state-driven expropriation of
foreigners’ assets and lack of continuity of public policy (rules are changed with each incoming
president). For an extensive discussion on the impact of a strong and independent regulator in the
privatization process, please see Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (eds.), Regulations, Institutions and
Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Shorter exclusivity periods create the conditions for a healthier competitive environment
to be established sooner rather than later.11 Increased competition after privatization is used as a
positive measure because it enhances the probability of competing firms to seek to achieve
optimal supply levels and lower prices for consumers.12 Furthermore, the strength of the
competitive regime designed by the government can be assessed by the ease of system
interconnection.13 Finally, a classification of the net results of the privatization should take into
account the improvements experienced in the services after privatization. For purposes of this
paper, a parameter to assess this variable will be the performance targets agreed upon between
the government and investors: the higher the performance targets agreed upon by investors – in
comparison to other telecom privatizations in the region – the greater the state’s bargaining
power.
The hypothesis will be confirmed if (i) I can demonstrate that the institutional
environments in Brazil and Argentina differed markedly with respect to the stability and quality
of institutions; and that (ii) the measurable variables were positive in Brazil in comparison to
11 In a newsletter entitled “Telecommunications Reform – How to Succeed,” the World Bank makes the
following statement: “In Latin America…countries that granted monopoly privileges of six to ten years to
the privatized state enterprises saw connections grow at 1.5 times the rate achieved under state
monopolies but only half the rate in Chile, where the government retained the right to issue competing
licenses at any time.” See Björn Wellenius. “Telecommunications Reform – How to Succeed.” Public
Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Network,
Note No. 130, October 1997.
12 Overwhelmingly, the literature on privatization (in particular of public utilities, as it is the case here)
links heightened competition to positive net social welfare gains in developing countries. Please see
Carsten Fink, Aaditya Mattoo and Randeep Rathindran. “An Assessment of Telecommunications Reform
in Developing Countries.” Policy Research Working Paper 2909 The World Bank Development Research
Group Trade, October 2002.
13 Interconnection is defined as the physical connection of the telephone networks owned by two different
operators in order to allow customers connected to different networks to communicate, to ensure the
interoperability of services. Please see Intven, Hank, Jeremy Oliver and Edgardo Sepulveda.
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook. World Bank Privatization Toolkits. Washington, DC.
November 2000, Glossary. This handbook may be downloaded from the World Bank’s website at
http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/TelecomsRegulation/.
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Argentina (e.g.: a greater premium and significant performance targets for telecommunications
services were agreed upon with investors in Brazil, in comparison to Argentina).
This study is grounded on the conceptual framework provided by New Institutional
Economics (NIE). According to the approach taken by the new institutional economics to
explain inflows of FDI, investors will most likely invest in countries where there is a favorable
perception of the strength, transparency, and reliability of institutions.14 Conversely, when
investors perceive the privatization process and the investment climate to be unclear and
unstable, they will most likely bargain with the state in order to lower prices or obtain a longer
exclusivity period (or both), in the case of the privatization of state monopolies. Consequently,
the instability and lack of a clear regulatory landscape may negatively influence the net results of
privatization, by either prompting investors to pay less for the shares being sold and/or by simply
transferring a monopoly from the state to the hands of private owners.
Overview of New Institutional Economics (NIE)15
Traditionally, the neo-classical economic theory has assumed that “transactions between
buyers and sellers are costless, instantaneous, and based on perfect information,” and that,
therefore, actors make perfectly rational and informed choices.16 The field of NIE has departed
from this neo-classical ideal to consider that institutions are not always effectively in place and
14 “Institutions” are the combination of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal
constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics. Unless otherwise noted, references to “institutions” in this paper shall be interpreted as
“formal constraints” only. The definition above was taken from Douglass C. North. “Economic
Performance Through Time.” American Economic Review 84, 359-368, in John N. Drobak and John V.
C. Nye (eds.) The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics (New York: Academic Press, 1997), pp.
21-22.
15 New Institutional Economics (NIE), institutional economics, and institutional theory will be used
interchangeably in this paper.
16 Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson and Douglass C. North (ed.) Empirical Studies in Institutional
Change. (New York: Cambridge, 1996), p. 97.
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that actors make irrational choices based on limited pieces of information. NIE builds on the
apparent failure of neoclassicists to take into account deficiencies of less developed economic
systems, such as high transaction costs, and weak property rights. 17 Most importantly, NIE
explores the question of how institutions may influence economic performance and business
decision-making. Douglass C. North, a Nobel Prize winning economist and one of the most
renowned researchers in the field of institutional economics, has stated that the “[neo-classical
theory] evolved in the context of the highly developed, efficient markets of the Western
world…characterized by the exceptional condition of low or negligible transaction costs” and as
such “[it] is…simply inappropriate…to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce
[economic] development.”18
Before analyzing the impact of institutions in a business environment, it is helpful to
clarify certain concepts from NIE that are relevant to this study. Property rights, transaction
costs, institutional policy, and institutional reform are essential concepts for the understanding of
the relevancy and analysis of these two case studies under NIE. In this paper, property rights are
defined as “social institutions that regulate the use of scarce resources by assigning and enforcing
rights and duties.19 Closely related to property rights is the concept of transaction costs. Author
Thráinn Eggertsson defines transaction costs as “the costs of control in a social
system…[transaction costs] arise when individuals try to acquire new ownership rights, defend
their assets against transgressions and theft, and protect their resources against opportunistic
behavior in exchange relationships.”20 Institutional policy, on the other hand, is the “art” of
17 Hariss et. Al (1997), p. 3.
18 Alston et al (1996), p. 342.
19 Thráinn Eggertsson. Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform. (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 27.
20 Ibid.
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creating new institutions or remedies for existing ones.21 Finally, of relevance to us is the
concept of institutional reform. The definition that suits this analysis best is that institutional
reform involves creating institutions, or changing existing ones, based on a policy makers’ goals.
The quality of an institutional reform is thus determined by the relation between the policy
makers’ goals and the instruments (institutions) created to achieve those goals.22 More
specifically, the idea of “quality” of the institutional reforms carried out during the two
privatizations under investigation emphasizes how institutions to govern the privatization process
were created – democratically or undemocratically, how often they changed, and the effect these
characteristics had on the perceived credibility of the state and its bargaining power.
Let us examine how institutions can have an impact on the business environment and in
attracting FDI to a particular country. In an environment where the state is highly interventionist
(i.e. most Latin American states until the 1990s), the formal rules of the game (i.e. institutions)
are determined by only one of the parties – the state – yet they affect the interests of all parties in
the market. Lack of consistency, transparency, and stability in the laws, regulations, and in the
management of any given sector of the economy increase transaction costs, threaten property
rights and send a message of instability and uncertainty to investors.
Such climate increases transactions costs because it encourages corruption (i.e. bribery)
and increases risk margins since it is more difficult for investors to predict the outcome of
investment decisions. It also threatens property rights because investors have little faith in the
ability of the state in protecting their investments and assets in the country – to be sure, in Latin




common precedent for such a fear.23 All of these conditions contribute to increase the so-called
“political risk,”24 which will be discussed in more detail below, and to a less-than-favorable
investment climate. Authors L.J. Treviño, J.D. Daniels, and H. Arbelaez stated in very plain
terms:
“[T]he role of institutions in an economy is to reduce transactions costs25 by reducing
uncertainty and by establishing a stable structure that facilitates interaction and empirical
results support the superiority of the institutional construct (rather than other theoretical
approaches, such as macroeconomics, which focuses on currency exchange and inflation
rates) to explain FDI into developing and transitional economies.”26
So, states competing to attract FDI should design policies that would strengthen
institutions and therefore lower transaction costs. Quan Li and Adam Resnick assert that
“attempts to increase bureaucratic competence or provide enhanced contract enforcement could
go a along way toward setting a country apart from competitors for FDI.” In this scenario, the
net welfare benefits to the state are higher because this model requires “less sacrifice of state
resources” and benefits extended to the society at large by virtue of “clearer costs and
incentives.”27
23 Almost every book on Latin American economic history makes reference to large nationalization
programs whereby governments suddenly announce that the foreign investors could no longer claim
ownership of their assets in the country. To be sure, in Bolivia today investors live under the constant
fear of nationalization by president Evo Morales, who has been threatening to expropriate the assets of
foreign companies in key sectors such as oil and gas.
24 Political risk may be defined as “the risk that a host country government will unexpectedly change the
institutional environment within which businesses operate.” K.C. Butler and D. C. Joaquin. “A Note On
Political Risk and the Required Return on Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of International Business
Studies 29, No. 3 (1998): 599-608 in Treviño et al. Arbelaez (2004), p. 236.
25 An alternative definition of transaction costs is to consider them “the costs of finding out what the
relevant prices are, of negotiating and…concluding contracts, and then of monitoring and enforcing them.
See Harris et al, p. 3.
26 L.J. Treviño, J.D. Daniels, and H. Arbelaez. “Market Reform and FDI in Latin America: An Empirical
Investigation.” Transnational Corporations, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2002), p. 29-48, in Len J. Treviño and
Franklin G. Mixon Jr., “Strategic Factors Affecting Foreign Direct Investment Decisions by Multi-
National Enterprises in Latin America,” Journal of World Business, Vol. No. 39 (2004): 234.
27 Quan Li and Adam Resnick. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” International Organization, Vol. 57, Winter 2003, p. 203.
Retrieved from Cambridge Journals Online February 14, 2005: http://www.journals.cambridge.org.
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Scholar Thráinn Eggertsson rightfully asserts that Latin America has a record of
asymmetric patterns of economic policies.28 The perception of inconsistency of policy and
instability of political institutions contributes to create political risk and to increased transaction
costs (e.g.: investors purchase insurance to cover political risk before investing in a country;
therefore, the perceived level of political risk is an important determinant of investment
decisions). 29 Len J. Treviño and Franklin G. Mixon Jr. have linked institutional reform aimed at
increasing transparency and reducing political risk to increased inflows of FDI, while North has
linked it to lower “transaction costs.”30 Hence, lower levels of perceived corruption, and
increased stability and reliability of institutions (elements associated with political risk and
transaction costs) is likely to attract foreign investors.31
It should be acknowledged that, besides institutional theory, macroeconomics (i.e.,
inflation, exchange rate behavior and national income) is another major theory explaining FDI
inflows to developing countries. However, recent studies presented empirical evidence
suggesting that, while the macroeconomic and institutional theories are complementary in
explaining FDI, the “institutional approach presents a stronger relationship with FDI than does
the macroeconomic theory.”32 That said, it may just be reasonable to argue that countries
interested in enhancing economic performance via FDI inflows, which was the case of Argentina
and Brazil, should make an effort to catalyze institutional reform to enforce rules and regulations
that are more transparent and stable. This could potentially lower transaction costs, strengthen
property rights, and create a regulatory environment congruent with that of more developed
28 Treviño et al (2004), p. 12. See also the Institutional Investor magazine (various issues) for data
concerning a country’s political risk and the levels of FDI inflows.
29 R. Hoskisson, L. Eden, C.M. Lau and M. Wright. “Strategy in emerging economies.” Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2000): 249-267, in Treviño et al (2004), p. 234.
30 Treviño et al (2004), 233-235.
31 Treviño et al (2004), 239.
32 Len J. Treviño and Franklin G. Mixon Jr. (2004), p. 237.
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markets from which capital may flow. NIE does appear to validate the claim that the
commitment to implement a stable institutional environment during privatizations helps create a
positive perception in the eyes of investors, and may, therefore, enhance the state’s bargaining
power during negotiations.
CHAPTER II – ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE LATE 20TH
CENTURY33
In order to understand the relevance of privatization in Latin America in the 1990s, one
must first understand the recent economic history of the region. This chapter offers a concise
overview of Latin American development policies throughout the second half of the 20th century.
This overview will cover policies ranging from the import substitution industrialization (ISI)
implemented in the post-War period through the liberal market reforms that helped push forward
the two privatizations under investigation.
Before World War I, Latin American countries implemented development policies by
applying a model based on the export of raw materials, the so-called export-led growth. Latin
American governments adopted a stance that fostered and protected those industries where each
country had a comparative advantage producing raw materials. However, the export-led model
33 This chapter draws extensively from the following works: Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith.
Modern Latin America, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Howard Handelman. The
Challenge of Third World Development. 3rd ed. (New York: Prentice, 2002); Carlos Waisman. Reversal
of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake. International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth 3rd. ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995), pp. 298-318; Victor Bulmer-Thomas. The Economic History of Latin America Since
Independence. 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. chapters 1, 4, 9-11; Sebastian
Edwards. Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), esp. Introduction, Part I and pp. 69-87; Kurt Weyland. The Politics of Market Reform in
Fragile Democracies. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 71-167; Robert A. Pastor (ed.),
Latin America’s Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past of Planning for the Future?” (Boulder: Lynne Riener
Publishers, Inc., 1987).
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of growth became increasingly unstable and risky due to the extremely volatile prices of raw
materials. In the early 20th century, with the Great Depression, the latent weakness of this policy
became apparent. As prices of primary products fell, the impact on Latin American countries’
balance of payments (the difference between what a country imports and what it exports over the
course of one year) was tremendous, especially because the export-led model relied heavily on
the import of industrialized products.34
The instability of the prices of raw materials, and the subsequent impact on the countries’
trading accounts, triggered a response from Latin American countries. This response took the
form of a new model for economic development, based on the domestic production of the
industrialized products that were once imported from developed countries. This policy came to
be known as the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI).35 ISI, its outcomes, and the policies
and trends that followed it are discussed in more detail in the subsections below.
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)
Generally speaking, when referring to inward-looking economic policies in Latin
America, the most common idea that comes to mind is that of statist and nationalistic economic
policies. The quintessential representation of this economic orientation is the import substitution
industrialization policy, or ISI. In fact, most Latin American countries have adopted this policy,
to varying degrees, at some point during World War II or in the period following it. ISI was
mainly adopted as a reaction to both the decline in the prices of raw materials in the international
34 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 82-152.
35 The term “inward-looking” development is commonly used to refer to the nationalistic tendency of
Latin American countries to focus on domestic production of industrialized goods; ISI is an inward-
looking development policy.
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market and, in part, due to the influence of policy strategists such as Raúl Prebisch, head of the
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL.36
This development strategy relied on the idea of fostering domestic industrial production
for domestic markets. Because private investment levels in Latin America were minimal, the
government was the largest investor in the infant industrial sector. It is from this ISI era that
large state-owned enterprises were created, or companies were “nationalized,” meaning the state
would become their sole owner. The capital invested came mostly from international financial
institutions, such as commercial banks, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). To be sure, ISI did produce economic growth during its initial stages, but its foundation
rested on flawed economic rationale, which over time, proved to be unsustainable.37
The economic rationale of ISI can be summarized as follows.38 The pillars of the ISI are
radical protectionism for domestic industry (mostly through high tariffs on imports), state
participation in productive activities (either through strong intervention or through ownership of
firms, the so-called state-owned enterprises), provision of subsidies to manufacturing sector
(usually capital-intensive industries, and not, as it should have been the case, labor-intensive
industries), and focus on selling to domestic markets only, as opposed to also focusing on the
export of outputs.
Domestic manufacturers, however, relied heavily on imported inputs. This proved to be a
great flaw, and greatly contributed the failure of ISI because domestic entrepreneurs depended on
prices set in the world markets.39 Therefore, a vicious cycle was created where the state
subsidized (directly or indirectly) and protected an industry that became capital-intensive, and
36 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 268-280.
37 Weyland (2002), pp. 73-75.
38 Michael P. Todaro. Economic Development in the Third World. 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1989),
pp. 427-449.
39 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 313-352.
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which could not absorb the growing labor force. This relationship between employment and
production provided the conditions for a static national consumer market, that is, a market
incapable of absorbing the goods being produced. Furthermore, domestic industries could not
take advantage of the economies of scale40 because demand was low due to limited consumption
within domestic markets. This trend, coupled with the high cost of imported inputs contributed
to transform the domestic industries into mammoths draining money from the state. Table
1Table 1 illustrates the dramatic increase in public spending during the 1970s in Argentina and
Brazil, and the proportions of SOEs alone.
[Insert Table 1: Growth of Public Sector in Argentina and BrazilTable 1: Growth of Public
Sector in Argentina and Brazil here]
The state solved this demand for capital by reaching out to international lenders, or by, at
times, simply printing money. The excessive borrowing those Latin American countries incurred
in the second half of the 20th century, to finance ISI projects eventually culminated with a
widespread crisis of continental proportions. This trend, associated with other external
conditions (i.e.: oil shock of 1973), led to two consequences that became chronic problems in
Latin America during the 1980s: the debt crisis and hyperinflation.
40 Economies of scale (or increasing returns on sale) occur when average total cost falls as output
expands. With increasing returns to scale, an increase in all inputs leads to a more than proportional
increase in output. Economies of scale mainly occur because of economies of specialization and from
better utilization of large capital equipment (for example, a large farm can make better use of a tractor
than a one-acre farm). See Walter J. Wessels, Barron’s Economics Business Review, 3rd ed. (New York:
Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2000), p. 332.
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The Debt Crisis and Hyperinflation41
As discussed in the previous section, governments implementing ISI projects looked
abroad to cover most of their capital shortages.42 Coupled with Latin America’s lack of
investment capital was ease with which international commercial banks, in particular, extended
credit to them.43 Authors Robert A. Pastor and Sebastian Edwards point out to the dangerous
combination of excess supply of money in developed nations, in particular oil-producing ones,
and the excess demand for money in developing nations, in particular those funding costly state-
owned enterprises.44 This combination led to an exponential increase in Latin America’s foreign
debt. Table 2Table 2 provides a snapshot of the increase in Latin American and the Caribbean
debt between 1970 and 1985.
[Insert Table 2: Latin America and the Caribbean: External Debt, 1970-1985Table 2: Latin
America and the Caribbean: External Debt, 1970-1985 here]
The crisis officially began in August 1982, with the announcement by Mexican Finance
Minister, Jésus Silva-Herzog, that his country could not keep servicing its debt as of that date.
However, what was initially thought to be an isolated event, quickly spread throughout the entire
region. With the Mexican announcement, commercial banks severely reduced, or ceased
completely, all loans to Latin American countries, triggering a domino effect reaction whereby
41 This section draws extensively from the following work: Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman. (eds.)
Debt and Democracy in Latin America. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), esp. chapters 2, 3, 6 and 11.
42 Pastor cites a speech given by George Shultz at a conference of the American States, on December 2,
1985, in which he estimated that approximately “three-fourths of the overall fiscal deficit of a sample of
developing countries were attributable to public enterprises.” In Pastor (1987), p. 19.
43 Edwards (1995), p. 17.
44 Pastor (1987), p. 7.
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all other highly indebted Latin American countries began soliciting a rescheduling of their debt
service payments.45
Author Sebastian Edwards identifies certain external and domestic historical causes of
the debt crisis. External causes were the slow rate of growth in industrialized countries, an
increase of world real interest rates, and a sharp decline in world commodity prices. All of these
causes resulted in the dramatic increase of Latin America’s trade deficits, and increased debt
service. The main domestic cause of the crisis, Edwards argues, was the tendency of Latin
America countries to over-valuate their national currencies against the dollar.46 It should be
noted that excessive government spending and an over-valued currency produce excess money
supply in the economy. This state of affairs contributed to the scenario of hyperinflation some
Latin American countries experienced in the 1980s.
The debt crisis and hyperinflation led some Latin American countries to experiment with
unorthodox adjustment programs. These policies emphasized exchange rate and price controls,
and deemphasized demand management and fiscal discipline.47 Both the Austral Plan, in
Argentina, and the Cruzado Plan, in Brazil, are clear representations of the rise and fall of
heterodox economics in Latin America during the so-called “lost decade.”
Argentina’s heterodox plan, the Austral Plan, was implemented in June 1985.48 It
focused on the management of prices, wages and exchange rate (public services and public
workers’ wages were frozen and exchange rate fixed), and a mild fiscal adjustment (prices of
public services were raised, import tariffs increased). Finally, a monetary reform was also
implemented, and the peso was replaced by a new currency, the austral. Although the initial
45 Pastor (1987), p. 9.
46 Edwards (1995), pp. 1-27; 69-114.
47 Edwards (1995), 18.
48 Stallings and Kaufman (1989), pp. 100-102. See also Judith A. Teichman. The Politics of Freeing
Markets in Latin America. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 103-107.
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results of the Austral Plan were positive49 (most heterodox plans succeed in the short-run), in
April 1986 the government decided to adopt a “price flexibilization” regime, allowing prices of
public services and wages to be raised.50 Along with the failure to ignite substantial and
sustained fiscal adjustment, this increase in prices brought the brief success of the Austral Plan to
a halt.
February 1986 was Brazil’s turn to experiment with its own heterodox plan – the Cruzado
Plan.51 A monetary reform replaced the currency, from cruzeiro to cruzado, with its value fixed
to the dollar and, similarly to the Austral Plan, the Cruzado Plan also involved a generalized
price freeze. The main goal of the government was to promote what is referred to as the
deindexation of the economy. Because economic actors anticipate hyperinflation rates, they
usually incorporate an adjustment index rate to contracts. This causes a phenomenon known as
“inflation by inertia,” triggering a hyperinflationary vicious cycle in the economy. Because of its
emphasis on deindexation, the plan succeeded in bringing inflation down in the short-term.52
However, as the Austral Plan, the Cruzado Plan failed to stipulate controls over demand and
fiscal adjustments. In September 1986 the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned and by
1987 wages and prices were adjusted, and the old scenario of escalating “inertial” hyperinflation
returned.53
49 Public deficit was reduced from 15% of GDP to 7% by late 1986; inflation lowered from 350% in the
first half of 1985 to slightly over 20% in the second half. See Edwards (1995), p. 35.
50 Edwards (1995), p. 19.
51 Stallings (1989), pp. 94-96. See also Juarez Brandão Lopes. “Obstacles to Economic Reform in
Brazil,” in Carlos H. Waisman and Arend Lijphart. Institutional Design in New Democracies. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 195-218.
52 Inflation was reduced from 450 percent annual rate during the first two months of 1986 to 2.1 percent
in the third quarter of 1986. See Edwards (1995), p. 37.
53 Edwards (1995), pp. 36-37.
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The first official recognition of debtor nations’ inability to service their foreign debt came
with the creation of the Baker Plan, in 1985.54 The underlying assumption of the Baker Plan was
that the problem of Latin American countries’ debt was one of illiquidity, rather than
insolvency.55 A new plan was devised after the Baker Plan failed to stop countries, such as
Brazil, from declaring a moratorium in 1987. 56 The Brady Plan was put in motion in 1989. The
plan went farther than the previous Baker Plan in that it established certain adjustment measures
debtor nations should follow in order to access any additional loans. The main financial feature
of the Brady Plan was the ability of private creditors to exchange their nominal Latin American
debt for bonds with lower face value, backed by U.S. Treasury bonds.57 The Brady Plan offered
some relief, though temporary, to the crisis initiated in 1982. The focus was on the
macroeconomic adjustment measures prescribed by international financial institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Among the main recommendations was
the privatization of state-owned enterprises as a means to generate capital to Latin American
debtor nations.58
Overall, it can be said that the main characteristic of the response from international
finance community to the debt crisis was the establishment of tighter requirements for the
provision additional loans. By the late 1980s, lenders began to pressure governments to perform
economic adjustments so that countries could achieve economic performance targets, such as
balance of payments ratios, reduction of public expenditures and fiscal responsibility. In the
1990s, the adjustment recommendations coming from the international financial community
54 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 360-361; Waisman and Lijphart (1996), pp. 224-230; Stallings, pp. 60-73.
55 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), p. 360.
56 In this case, a moratorium means the temporary, yet indefinite, suspension, of payments of a liability or
obligation.
57 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), p. 361; Teichman (2001), pp. 51-56.
58 Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 360-61; Teichman (2001), pp. 44-64.
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became more incisive. Eventually, creditors and the financial community in general, set out a
specific “agenda” that Latin American countries should adhere to in order to receive further
loans and foreign investment; this agenda was eventually termed the “Washington Consensus.”59
Washington Consensus
By the late 1980s, the economic thinking in Latin America began to change, following
the problems associated with the state’s mismanagement of the economy. The view based on
heavy state interventionism and inward-looking strategy that neglected macroeconomic
sustainability was replaced by a new way of thinking that emphasized macroeconomic concerns,
such as market liberalization and the reduction of state interventionism.60
There was a general agreement that the economic role of the state needed to be redefined
starting with the idea that the state should refrain from owning the means of production. This
redefinition of the role of the state in the economy gave rise to the wave of privatization
programs throughout Latin America. Those political leaders who had been supporters of
heterodox policies changed their orientation, and began supporting reforms to tackle fiscal
imbalances, promote trade and financial liberalization, and privatization. Carlos S. Menem, of
Argentina, was one such politician. Edwards points out that, from a historical perspective,
“…the convergence of views [in Latin America] was a remarkable event, comparable only to
changes that took place in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.”61
59 Author John Williamson first used the term “Washington consensus” in his book Latin American
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?,” in 1990. Williamson defines “Washington” as an ad-hoc
group of financial institutions, policymakers and think tanks interested in Latin American economic
issues; the consensus comprises a set of ten policy areas prescribed by “Washington.” See John
Williamson. “Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?” (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1990), Introduction.
60 Edwards (1995), pp. 58-65.
61 Edwards (1995), p. 43.
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The Washington Consensus comprises a well-defined set of orthodox reform
propositions. These propositions served as a roadmap to Latin American countries wishing to re-
establish themselves in the world economy and enable macroeconomic development. According
to author John Williamson, the main policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus
emphasized the following issues: fiscal deficits, public expenditures priorities (reducing
expenditures vs. raising tax revenues), tax reform, interest rates, exchange rate, trade policy,
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation (i.e.: price controls, restrictions on inflows
of foreign investments and outflows of profit remittance, labor laws, etc), and property rights.62
It is against this historical backdrop – vis-à-vis the liberal reforms and the Washington
Consensus – that the privatizations under investigation take place.
CHAPTER III – ARGENTINA
Throughout most of the 1980s, Argentina was unable to approve a budget, control
inflation, collect taxes appropriately, and win the confidence of both the international and
financial communities. By 1989, Argentina was at the height of an unprecedented economic
crisis.63 One common argument for the effectiveness of reforms under turbulent political
circumstances is the concentration of power within the executive branch. This is perhaps a
distinguishing feature of the ENTEL privatization. A strong executive branch will likely be
more effective in carrying out unpopular reforms by using its decree power. Guillermo
O’Donnell coined the term “delegative democracy”64 to describe this particular kind of
democracy; one in which the executive acts independently of the legislature, i.e.: legislating
62 Williamson (1990), pp. 1-20.
63 Javier Corrales, “Why Argentines Followed Cavallo: A Technopol Between Democracy and Economic
Reform, in Jorge I. Dominguez, Technopols, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997), p. 51.
64 O’Donnell, in Corrales (1997), p. 52.
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through decree. Most of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrate how Argentina’s credibility
was diminished during the ENTEL privatization due to Menem’s abuse of decree power, and
how this abuse made institutions unstable and unreliable throughout the entire privatization
process.
By the late 1980s Argentina was coping with hyperinflation and external debt problems
by implementing market-oriented reforms. Privatization was one of the pillars of this reform
project. In fact, the first attempt to privatize Argentina’s largest public utility company, the
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) was during the Raul Alfonsín
administration, in 1987. At the time, the Alfonsín administration was faced with a mounting and
unprecedented economic crisis in the Argentine economy, with deep fiscal imbalances and
hyperinflation. It has been reported that President Alfonsín secretly negotiated a deal with
Telefónica de España at that point. It would cost Telefónica US$3.5 billion to have exclusive
and monopolistic rights over all Argentine telecom services, including cable television, for
twenty years, with an option to extend this period to thirty years. The deal was rejected in the
Argentine Senate.65
The second privatization attempt occurred in 1990. This time around, the ENTEL
privatization was markedly affected by historical conditions such as the ongoing economic crisis
and domestic political instability. In fact, the privatization was opposed by a large portion of the
general public and by many political actors. These circumstances seriously impaired the ability
of president Carlos S. Menem to carry out his privatization program without creating serious
65 Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone, “What Peronists Propose for Argentina: Menem Tells
Europeans that There is ‘Nothing to Fear’.” Trends Section; RS-88-07; p. 4; September 8, 1988; see also
Alice Hill and Manuel Angel Abdala. “Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment. Privatization and
Regulation in the Telecommunications Sector.” World Bank Policy Research Paper 1216. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank Policy Research Department Finance and Private Sector Development Division,
November 1993, pp. 10-12.
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friction that could damage his political career and even threaten his presidency. The scenario
may have led Menem to think that using decree power was the only way to move the
privatization forward. In any case, the decision to privatize through decree had a negative
impact on the state’s bargaining power because the result of this institutional design was a rushed
sales process, marked by low instability, partiality and secrecy during the privatization process.
Menem’s Macroeconomic Policy
In Argentina, as in most Latin American countries such as Brazil, the privatization of
telecommunications services was tied to a series of liberal economic policies. This new liberal
economic program called for improvements in government’s fiscal position and fostering of
market-oriented policies as a way to boost economic growth.66
Argentina is a major player in Latin American politics. However, its history is marked
by political instability and military coups. In fact, the change of presidents in 1989 was the first
peaceful one since 1928. The Argentine economy is split between the greater Buenos Aires
region and the rest of the country. Industries are highly concentrated in Buenos Aires, and the
agricultural sector dominates the economic landscape in the rest of the country. Because of this
underlying economic cleavage, the country is also politically divided along those same lines. 67
Argentina’s political structure follows the classic division of power system, with the
executive, legislative and judicial branches. 68 The voting system is based on electoral colleges,
which, because of the political split outlined above, grants greater importance to voters residing
66 See John Ward, Latin America: Development and Conflict Since 1945, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge,
2004), pp. 38-57
67 Waisman (1987), chaps. 5-6.
68 This section draws extensively from the following works: Alice Hill and Manuel Angel Abdala,
“Argentina: The sequencing of privatization and regulation” in Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (eds.),
Regulations, Institutions and Commitment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 202-249;
Waisman (1987), pp. 9-11; 86-93; Waisman and Lijphart (1996), pp. 46-54.
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in the Buenos Aires area. Congress is divided between the upper house, the Senate, and the
lower house, the Chamber of Representatives. Senators are elected for a 9-year term, by
provincial legislatures, with two senators from each of Argentina’s twenty-three provinces. The
two senators from the capital Buenos Aires are elected following the same Electoral College
mechanism as the president. The Representatives are elected by universal adult suffrage from a
closed party list for a term of four years. A national election involving half the seats in the lower
house occurs every other year.
Party diversity is not a tradition in Argentine politics since historically only two major
parties dominated the political landscape: The Radicals and the Peronists. The Radicals’ base is
composed of a mainly middle-class constituency, whereas the Peronists’ support comes from
urban, unionized working class. After the 1983 elections, the Radicals controlled the presidency
and the Chamber of Representatives, and the Peronists controlled the Senate.
The election preceding the ENTEL privatization took place in May 1989 to select the
successor to president Raúl Alfonsín, of the Radical party. The newly elected president was
Carlos S. Menem, from the Peronists party. Menem won the election embracing a platform that
called for the articulation of the classic Peronist-populist doctrine, which emphasized “economic
nationalism, strong state regulation of the economy, economic growth through direct government
investments and financing of the private sector, and social justice favoring workers through
income distribution.”69 At the time of his election, Menem was a three-time governor of La
Rioja, one of Argentina’s poorest provinces. As governor, he succeeded in creating government
jobs and managed to include almost half of the working population in the province’s payroll.
Menem’s long-standing populist tendencies can be shown by his decision, as governor of La
69 Atilio Borón. El Menemato (Buenos Aires: Letra Buena, 1991); Gary Wynia. Argentina: Illusions &
Reality, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992, in Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American
Style. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 71.
SIMAO 32
Rioja, to unilaterally print currency, when the Alfonsín government cut off federal aid to his
province.70
The gravity of the situation prompted Peronists and Radicals to strike a deal to let Menem
take office five months ahead of schedule. Surprisingly, and in spite of the Peronist party’s long-
standing tradition of adopting nationalistic, inward-looking economic policies, Menem took a
liberal-oriented and reformist approach to reform the Argentine economy.71 That is, the Menem
administration sought to tackle Argentina’s economic crisis not through nationalization and other
populist policies, but through a firm resolve to implement free market policies, geared toward
attracting FDI.
However, this change in direction did not come without a political cost, since by taking
this new approach to solve economic problems, Menem substantially departed from his party’s
tradition. One week after Menem became president, he met with leaders of his party, including
Antonio Cafiero, who Menem defeated in the dispute for the Peronist party nomination for
president. According to an editorial article in the Argentine newspaper Clarín, the party leaders
“did not hide their displeasure at the fact that the newspapers had been their best source of
information on [Menem’s initial] decisions and appointments, in which the party had enjoyed no
effective participation.”72
70 Manzetti (1999), p. 71.
71 However, this change in direction should not have been a complete surprise to those following the
president’s campaign closely. In a news article covering Menem’s tour throughout Europe during his
presidential campaign in 1988, he was quoted as saying that he was “against state-oriented policies” and
that, as president, he would “seek to take into account the views of both employers and workers” (Latin
American Regional Report, “What Peronists Propose for Argentina,” September 4, 1988).
72 See James McGuire. Peronismo Without Perón: Union, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 244. For an extensive discussion on the relationship of
Menem with his party, and with union leaders, please refer to the following works: Carlos H. Acuña.
“Political Struggle and Business Peak Associations: Theoretical Reflections on the Argentine Case,” in
Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva (eds.) Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in
Latin America. (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1998), pp. 51-72; Maria Victoria Murillo. Labor
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There was greater, though uneven, support for Menem’s measures from the Peronist
union base. Author James McGuire states that while some union leaders opposed Menem’s
reforms (mainly, the unions from state-owned companies, such as ENTEL), the majority,
supported and cooperated with the president. McGuire gives two main reasons for this: first, the
recognition by some that the Peronist economic model had failed to bring sustainable growth.
Secondly, a majority of the unionized workforce seemed to fear hyperinflation more than they
did privatization.73 Author Maria Victoria Murillo argues that Menem’s change in direction is
partly due to this realization of the costs of hyperinflation – “it was a strategy for political
survival than ideological conviction.”74 The author makes reference to interviews conducted with
leaders of the FOETRA (Federation of Telephone Workers and Employees of the Argentine
Republic) and of SUPE (Union of State Owned Oil Workers). These leaders recalled a meeting
between Menem and union leaders in 1989, during which the president allegedly said: “the
Central Bank had run out of reserves, the country was bankrupt, and there was no alternative to
structural reforms to save democracy.”75
Given the widespread crisis, Argentina’s macroeconomic recovery based on a liberal
economic program depended on Menem’s ability to restore the confidence of investors.
Immediately after taking office, the president succeeded in forging a political coalition that
allowed him to pass the Economic Emergency Law (Law No. 23,697/89) and the State Reform
Law (Law No. 23,696/89), two all-encompassing state reform laws that would serve as a
platform for his macroeconomic policy. The Economic Emergency Law covered issues relating
Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
73 McGuire (1997), pp. 216-261.
74 Murillo (2001), p. 134.
75 Ana Margheritis. “Implementing Structural Adjustment in Argentina. The Politics of Privatization.”
University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Unpublished doctoral dissertation; in Murillo (2001), p. 134.
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to short-term public expenditures and certain structural adjustments to be taken in the medium-
term. In August 17, 1989 the Argentine Congress passed the Ley de Reforma del Estado (State
Reform Law).76 This law laid out the parameters for Menem’s privatization program, and
granted the president an unprecedented decree power to carry it out.77 The privatization program
Menem devised was, at the time, considered “one of the developing world’s most ambitious
privatization efforts.”78 Yet, it was also known for its “…treachery, intrigue, rumours of
corruption and impressive brinkmanship.”79
Because the State Reform Law gave the president unprecedented decree power, it also
avoided the need to bargain with Congress – in fact, Menem and his cabinet made every effort
not to involve Congress at all. The main rationale of the president’s aides was that the process
could be concluded faster by avoiding Congressional input. However, as it has been mentioned
before, this choice also established a sense of generalized instability. Relying on the president’s
decree power certainly sped up the process, but also meant that the terms and conditions of the
privatization were changed quickly, unilaterally, and often the decision-making rationale was not
entirely clear to those outside the immediate circle of bureaucrats involved in the process. This
sense of secrecy tainted the process and lowered Argentina’s credibility with investors.
One argument commonly made in favor of Menem’s choice is that speed was necessary
in the case of ENTEL. Hill and Abdala argue: “[T]he Menem government set out to change the
reputation of the government and, by extension, the country…[S]peed in implementation was
essential for the viability of the entire reform program.” 80 As it has been asserted above, Menem
76 Law No. 23,696/89.
77 Law No. 23,696/89.
78 John Barham. “Argentina On Line to Privatization.” Financial Times. November 13, 1990. Section I;
International Capital Markets; Pg. 37. Retrieved November 11, 2005 from LexisNexis Academic.
79 Barham, Financial Times. November 13, 1990.
80 Hill and Abdala (1993), p. 6.
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assured speed by relying solely on his decree power. The privatization was part of a major
macroeconomic policy, which depended on the degree of credibility of the government in the
eyes of foreign investors. However, if one agrees with this assertion, then the particular
privatization design chosen by Menem’s team should be questioned: Was speed a condition sine
qua non to lend credibility to the government’s program? Not necessarily so, it would appear.
Speed was achieved at the cost of the stability of institutions, which, as it will be discussed in
more detail in the following section, severely hurt the overall outcome of the privatization by
reducing investors’ perception of the government’s credibility.
Perhaps, one suitable explanation for the choice of privatization design has to do with the
historical conditions in Argentina at the time. Many authors claim that, given the volatility of the
political and economic environment in Argentina, relying solely on decree power to privatize
was the only possible choice that would make the privatization possible at all. Because the
government’s goal was to draw foreign investors into the process, one argument in favor of a
quick privatization was that investors could be “scared away”81 by the political environment in
Argentina should the process be stalled by political turmoil. In the view of the ENTEL’s
privatization team, it was necessary to “insulate the process from broad political participation,
while allowing private investors a role in the design of the privatization.”82
The underlying cause of the turmoil in Argentina in 1989-1990 was hyperinflation
because of its dramatic effects on both supply and demand (meaning, the ability of workers to
buy goods, and the ability of entrepreneurs to replenish inventories). Since May 1989, Argentina
was undergoing economic and social chaos: food and other essential goods such as medicines
were absent from shop shelves, gasoline was scarce and the police was extensively patrolling the
81 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 119.
82 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 120.
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streets to curb the wave of food riots that were occurring in Argentina’s major cities.83 By early
1990, Menem was also faced with threats of a military coup. According to an article in The New
York Times, “military leaders have warned that the country is approaching anarchy and
admonished people to close ranks behind their democratic government.”84 Against this backdrop,
many authors find it surprising that the ENTEL privatization occurred at all.
On the other hand, Menem’s liberal policies antagonized two different factions within the
Peronist party: those who supported traditional Peronismo, based on state-oriented policies, and
those who simply supported Menem (and who were not, necessarily, ideologically linked to the
market-oriented policies he was implementing). Menem declared, “He did not think he had to
make any compromises, whether with the opposition or his own party…it was enough…to form
a direct link to the people and their extraordinary wisdom.”85 This divide mounted over the
course of the ENTEL privatization and was exacerbated with the resignation of the party’s
president, Antonio Cafiero, in August 1990 (although Menem was nominated the new party
president, his brother, Eduardo Menem, became the de facto party’s president). Menem also
weakened some union leaders when he issued a decree taking away the constitutional right of
workers in the public sector to strike (he issued the decree after Congress had failed to approve
it).
83 Latin America Weekly Report. “Argentina’s Menem Has Little Time to Succeed Where Alfonsin
Failed.” RS-89-05; p. 1, June 29, 1989; Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone. “Coup-
mongering Spells Danger for Menem in Crisis-ridden Argentina. RS-90-01; p. 1, February 8, 1990.
84 Shirley Christian. “Argentina’s Military Chiefs Warn of Anarchy. The New York Times. Section A,
Page 3, Column 1, Foreign Desk. January 2, 1990. Note that a military coup was eventually attempted in
December 1990, but it was quickly defeated by troops supporting the government.
85 McGuire (1997), p. 245. Author Kurt Weyland offers a very interesting discussion about the populist
character of neoliberal leaders in Latin America (esp. Menem and Fujimori). Please see: Kurt Weyland,




In his book, “Privatizing Monopolies,” author Ravi Ramamurti highlights the importance
of planning and implementation to assure the success of any privatization program.86 It was
precisely in planning and implementation that the ENTEL privatization was an egregious failure.
It has been mentioned elsewhere in this paper that Menem initiated the privatization
process shortly after taking office, in September 1989, and had given only fourteen months to the
ENTEL privatization team to develop a privatization framework and conclude the sale.
Executive Decree 731/98 of September 12, 1989 established that the government was going to
“…demonopolize and deregulate telecommunications services to make them more efficient for
the benefit of users….” This decree also provided that the Inspectors of ENTEL87 had until
November 30, 1989, to submit a plan for the privatization and the regulatory guidelines for the
telecommunications sector (the Pliegos de Bases y Condiciones Generales y Particulares,” or
simply, pliegos) to the Ministerio de Obras y Servicios Públicos (Ministry of Public Works).
The Ministry, in turn, had until December 10, 1989, to evaluate and submit the pliegos to the
president for approval.88 Only a few months after receiving the immense task of preparing
ENTEL for sale, the team assembled by the president and headed by the state-appointed
interventora Maria Julia Alsogaray, presented a privatization plan for ENTEL that touched upon
the following issues: (i) the divestiture of ENTEL into several regional operating companies; (ii)
partial liberalization of the sector;89 (iii) a sale structure specially designed to attract foreign
86 Ramamurti (1996), Introduction.
87 The taskforce assembled by the president to prepare the privatization plan for ENTEL became known
as “la Intervención de ENTEL.”
88 Please see Decree 731/89, third line and article 1.
89 No competition would be allowed in basic phone services for the first five years after the sale.
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investors;90 (iv) the elimination of cross-subsidies;91 and (v) the prequalification terms for
prospective buyers based on technical expertise and international credentials.92 After
negotiations with potential investors, the government changed the sales plan and ENTEL was
divided into two operating firms, split between the southern and northern regions of the country;
the greater Buenos Aires area, which concentrated 59.2 percent of the national traffic, was
divided between the two operating companies.93
After revisions to the plan had been approved, the team of ENTEL Inspectors began the
process of preparing ENTEL for sale. This process may be divided into the following key areas:
(i) institutional reform; (ii) regulatory body and competition; (iii) financial restructuring; and (iv)
the sale. These areas will be analyzed in the following paragraphs, and, as it will be seen, all of
them contained flaws relating to the implementation of the privatization and the stability of
institutions.
Institutional reform. The definition and key features of a positive institutional reform in
the context of privatization have been discussed in Chapter I. In this regard, the main
characteristic in the Argentine case was the state’s failure to develop a regulatory framework for
telecommunications before the divestiture of ENTEL. As Petrazzini points out, “[A]part from
dividing the company into two regional operating entities, no other major legal, administrative,
90 Sixty percent of the company’s equity was to be sold to private investors (see Figure 3: ENTEL sale
modelFigure 3: ENTEL sale model).
91 “Cross-subsidy” means covering the cost of offering some services through excess revenues earned
from other services. In telecommunications, the term “anti-competitive cross-subsidy” normally refers to
a practice by a dominant firm of offering services in competitive markets at low (e.g.: below-cost) prices,
while maintaining overall firm profitability by charging above-cost prices in monopoly markets, or in
other markets where the firm enjoys market power. See World Bank’s Telecommunications Regulation
Handbook, Appendix C, Glossary.
92 Only consortiums led by private foreign companies with extensive operating experience would qualify.
It should be noted here that, although the pliegos clearly stated that no companies belonging to sovereign
states would qualify to buy ENTEL, the governments of Spain, Italy and France were major shareholders
of Telefónica and Telecom, respectively.
93 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 121.
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or financial changes were made” to the existing institutional framework.94 Notwithstanding, the
president’s team made clear the pliegos would prevail in the case of a conflict between it and any
other Argentine laws, including the Constitution.95
In terms of institutional reform, the emphasis is in how institutions to govern the
privatization process were created – democratically or undemocratically, how often they were
expected to change – stability or instability of the institutional environment, and the effect that
these choices had in the perceived credibility of the state and its bargaining power.
Regulatory body and competition. The government’s decision was to leave basic local
telephone services, the core of the privatization transaction, as a monopoly for five years after
privatization. After pressure from the only two remaining bidders, the government granted an
additional two years of exclusivity. Three years would be added to that should the companies
demonstrate that the efficiency targets stipulated by the government had been met. However,
considering how modest the Argentine targets were, effectively, the two winning companies
were given ten years of exclusivity rights.
The emergence of a competitive environment in telecommunications depends,
fundamentally, on the ability of new entrants to interconnect with the existing system.
Therefore, one crucial recommendation from the World Bank and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) concerns the development and enforcement of specific rules
covering system compatibility. Ideally, potential buyers should know these rules as early as
94 Ibid.
95 In fact, Ben Petrazzini titles his article covering the ENTEL privatization as “Privatization in a hurry.”
He argues “[S]peed was the main reason for not undertaking any major regulatory or organizational
changes.” See Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 123.
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possible in the process.96 In Argentina, the government required that the two winning companies
allowed interconnection of new entrants after the exclusivity period, however, it did not specify
what requirements the system should meet. In other words, the two incoming buyers had total
freedom to set the system in any way they saw fit. Furthermore, the interconnection fees would
be agreed upon by the parties, that is, the two major companies and new entrants. Naturally, this
scheme greatly diminished the ability of new entrants to bargain with the two giant operators.
The government determined that the regulator, when created, would be the moderator in any
dispute between new entrants and the two incumbents. However, Argentina did not have a de
facto regulator until long after the privatization (a decree issued shortly before the sale created a
regulator; however, the regulator was deemed ineffective until 1992).
The government agency responsible for devising a regulatory framework for the
telecommunications sector was the Secretariat of Communications, but, as Petrazzini asserts,
“…control of the telephone company was dispersed among various government agencies,
leading to an unstable and unpredictable environment.”97 The Secretariat was responsible for
developing a comprehensive regulatory framework based on the principles outlined in the
pliegos. Interestingly enough, the head of the Secretariat and his staff opposed the privatization
and, therefore, the agency did not respond to the request to produce the regulatory decree until
late June 1990, after final bids had already been placed (and despite the fact that the Argentine
government had promised prospective buyers that a regulatory framework would be in place by
February 1990).98 The regulatory decree issued in June 1990, laid out certain regulatory
guidelines, and created a government agency to serve as the regulator, the Comisión Nacional de
96 Please see World Bank’s Telecommunications Regulation Handbook. See also the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) website at www.itu.org for more detailed recommendations with
respect to the establishment of a competitive environment following privatization.
97 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 133.
98 Hill and Abdala (1993), p. 21.
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Telecomunicaciones, CNT (National Telecommunications Commission).99 CNT’s main function
was to “apply, interpret, and enforce laws, decrees, and other norms in the telecommunications
sector.”100 Once in operation, CNT restricted its role to simply monitoring compliance of the
private owners with the concession contracts signed during the divestiture. Before issuing the
regulatory decree, the president fired all personnel at the Secretariat, only to hire them back to
staff the newly created CNT (despite the fact they did not support the privatization in the first
place). As evidence of the poor governance strategies devised by the Menem’s team, the
Secretariat not only failed to produce the regulatory framework on time, but it also did not take
any action to implement it after CNT had been created. Hill and Abdala state “although a well-
defined regulatory framework was legally in place, regulatory practice did not conform to the
framework…[T]his created an ambiguous setting for all the participants in the
telecommunications sector.”101 In January 1992, in light of the ineffectiveness and apathy of
CNT’s staff, Menem fired all of its board members and replaced them with one inspector and
four sub-inspectors.
Financial restructuring. In contrast to the Brazilian case, ENTEL’s cash flows were not
balanced prior to the sale.102 The only financial issues the government dealt with before the sale
were ENTEL’s debt, tariff levels and pricing regime. The government approved the purchase of
new equipment for ENTEL as soon as the privatization process was initiated. These purchase
99 Decree 1,185/90. According to Hill and Abdala (1993), the World Bank provided assistance in
preparing this decree.
100 Decree 1,185/90, arts. 5 and 6.
101 Hill and Abdala (1993), pp. 24-32.
102 A company has three key types of financial statements: balance sheet, income statement and cash
flows. The balance sheet provides a snapshot of a companies assets and liabilities position at any given
point in time; the income statement indicates the firm’s profitability during a certain period; the cash
flows reconciles both the balance sheets and the income statements, recording the transactions described
therein after they have actually occurred. Saying that a firm’s cash flows have not been balanced is the
same as to say that an outsider will not have the true picture of the firm’s cash position; only the estimates
provided by the other two statements.
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contracts increased ENTEL’s corporate debt to US$862 million; US$482 of which the
government assumed. Initial tariff levels were one of the most crucial issues, and one that was
negotiated until shortly before the sale. Buyers threatened to withdraw completely from the
process if the government did not grant an additional 27 percent increase over the 190 percent
that had already been aggregated to the local pulse price as of June 1990. Finally, the pricing
regime was the only one in which Congress was involved. Initially, Congress accused Menem of
inflating the valuation of assets upon which to base the rate of return to be provided to new
owners. Menem used an artificial amount of US$3.2 billion in lieu of ENTEL’s real operating
assets’ value, which Congress demonstrated, was US$1.9 billion.103
A note on basic business valuation principles is required here. The discounted cash flow
valuation method is commonly used to value firms where cash flows are more important than
actual net income (the case of ENTEL). By using the discounted cash flow method, the value of
the business is determined by subtracting the present value of the firm’s liabilities from the
present value of its cash flows and tangible assets. ENTEL was going to generate the same
amount of money regardless of the price investors paid. Menem probably inflated the value to
make it seem like buyers were getting a lower return than was really the case – this would please
Congress. On the other hand, Congress’ intervention in lowering the asset value of ENTEL
pleased investors, since this valuation serves as one of the criteria (not the main one) for setting
the minimum floor price investors would pay. In the end, the manipulation by Menem’s team of
such an important issue may have only reinforced the negative perceptions of investors.
The sale. The pliegos determined the structure for the sale of ENTEL and determined
that the final transfer should take place on October 8, 1990. Figure 3Figure 3 illustrates the
ENTEL the sale structure.
103 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 125.
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[Insert Figure 3: ENTEL sale modelFigure 3: ENTEL sale model here]
Fourteen consortiums purchased the bidding kit for US$20,000 at the beginning of the
early spring of 1990; however, by April 19, 1990, only seven submitted applications for
prequalification; and by June 1990, only three remained (Telefónica, Spain; Stet and Cable et
Radio/Telecom, Italy and France; and Bell Atlantic Corporation, United States).104 The rate at
which potential bidders withdrew from the process was unusually high. This may be attributed
to the inconsistent, and often conflicting, set of norms that the several decrees issued by the
president created early in the process. In March 1990, the SIGEP (Sindicatura de Empresas
Públicas), in Argentina, prepared a report to assess the extent to which the decrees issued by
Menem in the ENTEL privatization were conflicting within themselves. According to the report,
there were a number of contradictions even within the same presidential decree. For instance,
the first article of Decree 62/90 sets forth certain conditions for a company to qualify for the
bidding process. However, article 3.1.11 of the same decree provides that any pre-qualified
company could be replaced by a subsidiary, even if such subsidiary did not meet the conditions
set forth on article 1. Article 3.2.2 of the same decree determined that no disqualified company
had the right to file a complaint against the rejection, however, articles 3.10 and 5.8.1 stated that
rejected companies had up to five days to file a complaint against rejection.105
Even though the pliegos prohibited both operating companies from being awarded to the
same buyer, the Telefónica consortium placed a bid for both the northern and southern
companies; it was eventually awarded the southern company. After matching Telefónica’s offer,
Bell Atlantic was awarded the northern company. However, U.S. laws imposed restrictions on
Bell Atlantic’s ability to participate in foreign investments. According to American legislation,
104 The “bidding kit” is a commonly used term to refer to the set of documents prepared by the
government, which contains the terms and conditions of the privatization.
105 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 126.
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Bell Atlantic could only participate with 4.9% in its consortium, and that was against the
provisions in the pliegos.106 At the last minute Menem issued a decree, changing the terms of the
pliegos to accommodate Bell Atlantic’s constraint. Bell Atlantic’s consortium, however,
ultimately withdrew its offer because its main investment bank was unable to raise enough
Argentine foreign debt to fulfill its bid. Thus, the government was left with no choice but to
award the northern company to Telecom.107
A crucial issue in the privatization was the price to be paid by investors, and the terms of
payment. During the prequalification process, some members of the Menem cabinet said that
they would only accept cash in payment for the companies. However, after long debate and
pressure from the prospective buyers, the government settled on a debt-equity swap108 as the
primary method of payment. Thus, the final structure was set as follows: a minimum cash
payment of US$214 million was set as the ceiling (see figure above), US$380 million in
ENTEL’s corporate debt payable over three years (see figure above), plus any additional amount
in Argentine foreign debt as each consortium wished to bid (a floor of US$3.5 billion was
established). The final sale price of the sixty percent stake of ENTEL was US$214 million in
cash, US$380 in corporate debt and US$4,620 million in Argentine sovereign debt and
associated interest at face value.109
106 Banks, financial institutions, ad-hoc investors, and at least one operator, with the operational
infrastructure and expertise to provide the services being privatized, usually form consortiums to buy
privatizing companies. Bell Atlantic entered the consortium as the main “expert” in the provision of
telecommunications services. Pursuant to the provisions in the pliegos, a member serving in the “expert”
capacity in the consortium should have a participation of more than the 4.9%.
107 La Nación. “En Una Tensa Jornada, se Ajudico al Grupo STET la Zona Norte.” October 8, 1990.
108 A refinancing deal in which a debt holder gets an equity position in exchange for cancellation of the
debt. In the case of ENTEL, a great portion of the payment was in the form of sovereign Argentine debt.




Investors were able to realize huge savings with the debt-equity financing structure.
Argentine foreign debt instruments were quoted in the secondary market at 19 cents of the dollar
at the time of sale; this meant that the actual price investors paid for the US$4,620 million worth
of Argentine debt was, in fact, US$877 million. In November 1990, the Northern and Southern
companies were transferred to their respective new owners (please refer to Table 6Table 6 for a
list of all members of the winning consortia). The premium earned by the state was not
impressive. Market analysts usually place a premium of at least 40 percent on the sale of
company of this magnitude, and with a significant exclusivity rights period after the
privatization.110 In the case of ENTEL, the government attained 27.36 percent – and that is the
case because the assumption was that investors paid the actual US$4,620; instead of the market
value the Argentine debt, which as of the date of the sale, was equivalent to US$877.111 Table
3Table 3 shows the proceeds and premiums paid for both the Northern and Southern companies.
[Insert Table 3: Proceeds and Premium: ENTEL Privatization (in US$
million)Table 3: Proceeds and Premium: ENTEL Privatization (in US$ million) here]
Corruption scandals emerged following the ENTEL privatization. After the sale it
became public that, in the end, the other two consortiums also failed to gather enough debt
financing.112 On March 23, 1991, the Argentine federal police arrested several members of a
gang led by managers of both Telecom and Telefónica. According to an article on the Latin
110 Based on this author’s conversations with investment bankers in the area of telecommunications.
111 Note that banks that were creditors of Argentina at the time participated in the deal (e.g.: J.P. Morgan)
because swapping Argentina’s debt instruments for ENTEL’s equity was the only way they saw would
enable them to collect the debt.
112 Manzetti (1999), p. 110.
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American Report, this gang illegally installed 5,000 telephone lines in the capital, Buenos
Aires.113
As seen above, the sale of ENTEL went on with much commotion: It was rushed, the
rules were unstable – the government either created conflicting rules, or did not complied with
the rules that it had created. Ricardo Zinn was the second-in-command in the ENTEL
privatization team, after Ms. Alsogaray. On April 4, 1990, Mr. Zinn resigned from his post,
stating “[T]o invest in Argentina is to run a very high risk because the rules are changed every
two or three months.”114 In addition to the discontent of some members of the government, the
constant changes in the requirements for the debt-equity swap that took place during the sale
annoyed bankers involved in the project; consumers, on the other hand, were overwhelmed by
the 2,400 percent increase in telephone bills between January and May 1990. In the end, the
privatization of ENTEL was marked by what was then considered a characteristic of the
Argentine government: “unreliability when it comes to sticking to the rules.”115 In the end, the
ENTEL privatization was almost entirely done via the so-called “decrees of necessity and
urgency.” Manzetti summarizes well the tone of this privatization program:
“[T]hrough such decrees the executive assumes legislative powers without congressional
approval…[F]rom 1853 and 1989 this type of decree power was exercised twenty-five
times. Menem, between 1990 and 1994, used them over 300 times…and to prevent
Congress from changing important legislation affecting the privatization program,
Menem also made an unprecedented use of total and partial presidential vetoes.”116
By 1991, despite the successes of reforms carried out by Menem and his newly appointed
Finance minister, Domingo Cavallo (i.e.: inflation at ten percent per month and foreign reserves
113 Latin American Weekly Report. “Do-it-yourself Privatization,” Politics; Argentina; WR-91-13; Pg. 12,
April 4, 1991. Retrieved November 11, 2005 from LexisNexis Academic.
114 Gary Mead. “Crossed Lines Over Privatisation” Financial Times. Section I; American News; Pg. 8,
May 25, 1990. Retrieved November 11, 2005 from LexisNexis Academic.
115 Ibid.
116 Manzetti (1999), p. 110.
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at the record level of US$2.8 billion, for instance), Argentina “…continued to be a case of
reform non-credibility and societal noncooperation.”117 One important question that could be
raised is whether Menem’s personal profile and past as a populist politician influenced the way
he was perceived by the international investor community. In contrast to Brazilian president at
the time of the Telebrás sale, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was generally seen as an
accomplished scholar before being a politician, Menem was famous for being a career politician
with rather strong populist tendencies. So, perhaps, investors simply did not “buy” into his
sudden change of direction when the time came to put reform in motion.
The message Menem wanted to convey to international investors was one of an
Argentina “…serious about business, economically competent, fiscally responsible and
internationally linked…everything that Menem himself was not.”118 While one may argue that
amidst acute crises, reforms are only possible with a strong executive exercising decree power, a
government wanting to achieve credibility might indeed have more chances of achieving it by
going through democratic channels, instead of bypassing them. Economic governance is often
defined as the capacity of state leaders to accomplish their self-declared goals. As was the case
of Menem in the ENTEL privatization, the very goals of the liberal reform he set out to achieve
were contradicted by the way in which he chose to carry out those reforms to begin with.
Incoherence and instability in the process only augmented investors’ perception that Menem did
not truly believe the liberal principles he so vehemently defended.
Recall from Chapter I that the state’s bargaining power can be measured by its ability to
negotiate the most favorable terms with investors. Besides the general analysis of the transaction
and the institutional environment surrounding it, some measurable variables to asses the degree
117 Corrales, in Dominguez (1997), p. 61.
118 Corrales, in Dominguez (1997), p. 60.
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of the state’s bargaining power are the premiums obtained with the sale, performance targets
agreed upon by investors and the length of the exclusivity period granted by the government.
Compared to other Latin American countries privatizing at the time, Argentina received the
lowest price per line in service. CANTV, of Venezuela, received US$2,900 per line; Teléfonos
de México (TelMex) received US$1,653; while ENTEL received only US$800 per line in
service.119 Again, relative to other Latin American countries privatizing around the same time,
the Argentine targets were minimal. Mexico, when privatizing TelMex, granted 7 years of
exclusivity to the new owners, but in return, it required a network growth rate of at least 12
percent per year, while Argentina required only 6.5 percent (dropping to 2.8 percent between
1995 and 1996). Mexico required that the new owners install digital networks in twenty-two
Mexican cities and 9 miles of fiber optic network throughout the country; the Argentine
government was silent regarding the introduction of digital technology.120 As for competition, it
suffices to say that the telecom market in Argentina today is still dominated by the two winning
bidders of 1990: Telefónica and Telecom.121
Perhaps, one of the most incisive statements concerning the flaws of the ENTEL
privatization came from Domingo Cavallo, Menem’s powerful Finance Minister. According to
an article in the Latin American Report (December 12, 1996), Mr. Cavallo declared, “…the
privatizations of ENTEL and Aerolineas Argentinas were flawed inasmuch as they represented
replacing state monopolies with private ones.”122
119 Petrazzini, in Ramamurti (1996), p. 129.
120 For more details on this, please refer to the International Telecommunications Union website at
www.itu.org.
121 The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Telecommunications Industry Forecast, Americas,” June 2005, p.
21.
122 Latin American Weekly Report. “Cavallo Lists ‘Mistakes.’” Argentina; Economy; WR-96-48; Pg. 574,
December 12, 1996. Retrieved November 11, 2005 from LexisNexis Academic.
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CHAPTER IV – BRAZIL
The literature concerning the privatization of public utilities praises the Telebrás case as
one of the most successful privatizations in Brazil, both in terms of proceeds earned,
improvements in the performance of telecom services and competition.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s macroeconomic policy depended on increasing
inflows of FDI, and, under the president’s view, a plan to insert Brazil into the circuit of major
players in a globalized economy depended on the modernization of the country’s
telecommunications sector.123 To that effect, during his first term in office, the president took
measures to deregulate and privatize the state-owned telecom company, Telecomunicações do
Brasil, Telebrás (Brazilian Telecommunications Company).
One of the distinguishing features of the Telebrás transaction is the institutional reform
implemented before the privatization. The reform included measures to break the existing state
monopoly, foster competition, and phase out an archaic and expensive system of state subsidies.
In addition, it included the drafting of a comprehensive new law to govern the
telecommunications sector and the creation of a regulatory agency, Agência Nacional de
Telecomunicações, Anatel (National Telecommunications Agency) — all prior to the
privatization, in contrast with the Argentine case.
Before going into the analysis of this case, it is paramount to acknowledge that this
privatization occurred under considerably different historical conditions. The Brazilian
transaction occurred almost a decade after the ENTEL deal. Intuitively, this leads one to think
123 See João Resende-Santos. “Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Social and Institutional Rebuilding in
Brazil,” in Dominguez (1997), pp. 145-94.
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that the Brazilian government had the opportunity to learn from other governments’ mistakes
when dealing with privatization.
In addition, Brazil was living in a very different historical moment: the economic,
political and social circumstances surrounding the Telebrás privatization were unquestionably
more favorable. The root of this study lies precisely in acknowledging this historical difference
when analyzing economics: the influence of historical conditions in the way institutions shaping
policies are designed and implemented. The remainder of this chapter discusses Cardoso’s
macroeconomic policy and the historical conditions surrounding his reform program, and the
Telebrás privatization transaction in detail.
Cardoso’s Macroeconomic Policy
Brazil is the third most populous democracy in the world, after India and the United
States. It is both a wealthy (2004 GDP: US$452.4 billion) and unequal country (one of the most
unequal distributions of income in the world), with a past of authoritarian regime.124 Brazil is a
federative republic composed of twenty-six, each with own governor. The Constitution of 1988
establishes the presidential system and three independent branches of power: Legislative (House
of Representatives and Senate, at the federal level), executive and the judiciary. In Brazil, party
formation and membership is very volatile and fluid; estimates are that, at the time of the
privatization, there were approximately fifteen active political parties in Brazil. Contrary to
Argentina at the time of the ENTEL privatization, one of the characteristics of the Brazilian
political system is party diversity and fluidity. As João Resende-Santos point out, the Brazilian
party system is “highly fragmented…nonprogrammatic… uninvolved in policy formulation,”




and “dominated by personalities and ephemeral factions rather than well-defined philosophies or
stable policy coalitions.”125 The exceptions are the leftist Workers’ Party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores, PT)126 and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia
Brasileira, PSDB), the party co-founded by Cardoso in 1988, and of which he remains the main
intellectual leader. These two parties present a strategy somewhat aligned with certain political
principles and themes that appear recurrently in their political rhetoric (for instance, the
Workers’ Party present itself as inherently leftist, with internal divisions showing different
degrees of leftist radicalism; while the PSDB demonstrates an alignment with social-democratic,
and economic liberal principles).
Cardoso, who in the 1970s was one of the creators of the associated-dependent
development theory, sustained his position through the 1990s, arguing that Latin American
countries should take advantage of the dynamic nature of the international markets in order to
‘catch up’ in their level of development.127 He asserted that, notwithstanding the negative socio-
economic position that the periphery (underdeveloped) countries occupy in relation to the center
(developed) countries, there are ways whereby the two could integrate and function within the
global economy.
Cardoso won the presidential election in 1994 with fifty-four percent of the vote against
leftist opponent Luís Ignácio Lula da Silva, from the Workers’ Party. His victory was attributed
125 Resende-Santos, in Dominguez (1997), p. 164.
126 It should be noted, however, that the current president of Brazil, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, is from the
PT, and contrary to what observers had anticipated, he has adopted an economic policy that leans toward
the continuation, rather than break, of Cardoso’s policies.
127 Fernando Henrique Cardoso became internationally acclaimed in the 1970s due to his contributions to
the development of the “dependency theory,” which maintains that third world countries’
underdevelopment is based on their reliance on foreign capital and technology. See Handelman (2002), p.
21; see also Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependence and Development in Latin
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
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to the optimistic wave brought about by his successful economic plan, the Plano Real.128 As
Minister of Finance during the Itamar Franco administration (1992-1994), Cardoso (who is a
sociologist129) headed the team that designed the economic plan that brought down inflation rates
(i.e. price stabilization) based on a tightly controlled exchange rate, trade liberalization, and high
interest rates. This macroeconomic policy increased current account imbalances due to raising
trade deficits. The need for excess capital to cover deficits made privatization and investment
(foreign, that is, since domestic savings were low) the pillars of Cardoso’s macroeconomic
policy.
Because of the success of his economic plan in 1994, Cardoso became a political
celebrity. His party won gubernatorial elections is six states (Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro being the most important). However, to secure these victories his party, the PSDB,
forged a coalition with the center-right parties, such as the Partido Frente Liberal (PFL) and the
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). These coalitions were decisive for
PSDB to reach a large base of voters, but it also meant that Cardoso had to offer compromises in
many reforms he had hoped to accomplish during his first term, such as administrative, tax and
social security reforms. Nevertheless, voters gave Cardoso a mandate in the 1994 elections, and
his political coalition granted him a solid base in Congress that seemed strengthened by his
victory.
There were political, ideological and historical (both internal and external) elements
pushing for privatization at the time of Cardoso’s first term. The political trade-off with the
128 William C. Smith and Nizar Messari, “Democracy and Reform in Cardoso’s Brazil: Caught Between
CliENTELism and Global Markets?” The North-South Agenda 31, No. 33. The North-South Center,
University of Miami, September 1998, p. 3.
129 Resende-Santos offers a careful analysis of dependency theory as it was conceived by Cardoso, and
warns against oversimplification of his ideas, in such as the cycle of development-of-underdevelopment
suggested by André Gunder Frank. See Resende-Santos, in Dominguez (1997), p. 153.
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center-right parties came when Cardoso had to pace his privatization program. These parties (the
PFL, in particular) had long supported the privatization of strategic sectors such as
telecommunications. Even though the president shared this idea, he was pressured to accomplish
privatizations at a much faster pace than he would have hoped given his concern with the
“socially necessary” criteria—that is, to privatize with careful planning to attend to the social
impact of privatization (i.e.: the creation of a safety net for workers displaced by the new private
owners).
This is not to suggest that, however, that Cardoso’s reforms did not face resistance in the
political arena. The Workers’ Party, in particular, offered fiery opposition to the president’s
reform package. The president had to bargain with Congress. In order to secure votes for the
reforms needed in the telecom sector, the president had to make concessions such as postponing
parts of the administrative, tax and social security reforms.130 Even though, the government was
able to pass the reform in the telecommunications sector, it was not by a majority in Congress;
and again, most of the opposition came from the Workers’ Party and PMDB.131
Still, congruent with Cardoso’s associated-development ideology, he saw the need to
pursue a policy that would plug the economy into the world markets and reduce the technology
gap brought by the inefficiency in the state-owned telecom company, Telebrás. In addition, he
fostered the idea of seeking development through increased efficiency and productivity growth,
instead of the simple accumulation of capital by the state. This way, it made little sense for the
state to continue to hold large public utilities monopolies such as Telebrás. Furthermore,
Cardoso’s privatization plans enjoyed public support, not only because the general public viewed
130 Weyland (2002), pp. 228-231.
131 Latin America Weekly Report. “Stock Exchanges Have a Bad Week: Concern About Argentina and
About Privatization Plans,” February 23, 1995. Section: Brazil; Economy & Politics; WR-05-07; p. 82.
Retrieved November 11, 2005 from LexisNexis Academic.
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FDI inflows in a positive light, but also because of generalized skepticism with respect to state-
owned monopolies. During a meeting with a group of businessmen in Brasilia, in 1995,
Cardoso, asserted, in rather forceful terms, “the people have realized that monopolies have
become obstacles to progress and not contributions to it.”132
Another force rushing privatizations came from the historical conditions of the global
markets. In the 1990s, at the height of the Washington consensus agenda, developing countries
were competing with one another for increasing flows of FDI. A country seeking to win the
battle for FDI had to convey to investors that it would adhere to at least some of the
recommendations of the Washington consensus agenda, which was heavily based on privatizing
SOEs and redefining the role of the state in the economy.
Domestically, historical developments were also favorable to privatization. The change
in the macroeconomic scenario — meaning, inflation under control —sparked Brazilians’
interest in macroeconomic issues.133 Perhaps because of rather simplistic connections suggested
to the general public in the popular media channels, most Brazilians associated privatization with
foreign “money” and the latter with more jobs and opportunities. So, political capital (in the
form of the center-right coalitions forged in Congress), ideological background, and historical
conditions combined to create the momentum needed to push Cardoso’s institutional reform and
privatization plan for the telecommunications sector.
Privatization signaled to foreign investors that the state was committed to downsizing its
interventionist capacity and to adopting a more market-friendly model of economic
132 Latin America Weekly Report. February 23, 1995.
133 At the time there was a common saying in Brazil which was: “Every “true” Brazilian should know
“everything there is to be known” about two things in the world: soccer and the national politics.” The
economy just turned into conversa de bar (bar’s talk), along with soccer and politics.
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development.134 As mentioned before, the government’s plan was to attract foreign investors
and maximize the margin of profits in the sales of SOEs in order to obtain the most cash for the
privatized monopolies to finance public debt. The design and implementation of a
comprehensive and transparent institutional framework for the privatization of Telebrás was in
the interest of the state insofar as it could potentially maximize the state’s credibility and,
therefore, its ability to earn higher proceeds at the time of privatization. Thus, investors’
perception of stability and reliability of the privatization process greatly contributed to enhance
the government’s bargaining power and, consequently, the net returns obtained with the sale.
The state monopoly over public utilities was determined in the Brazilian Constitution.
Therefore any attempt to privatize the telecommunications sector had to begin with a
constitutional amendment. The first act toward the creation of an institutional framework for the
privatization of public utilities came with the Lei de Concessões (Concessions Law, No. 8987, of
February 1995), which amended article 175 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and introduced
rules concerning the concession of infrastructure services in general, including
telecommunications.135
The Concessions Law was the first milestone on the path toward a more transparent and
predictable institutional framework for potential investors in the privatization of public utilities.
134 Armando Castelar Pinheiro and Kiichiro Kukasaku, “Privatization in Brazil: The Case of Public
Utilities.” Ensaios BNDES 10, 1999. (In English)
135 Among other things, the Concessions Law sets forth that (i) tariffs should be determined in the
concession contracts and should not be based on the cost-of-service; (ii) concessions could no be granted
indefinitely, and could be renewed periodically; (iii) performance and tariff rates would be the main
elements and evaluating a concessionaire, (iv) it prohibited public subsidies, entitled consumers to
participate in the process of supervising bids, negotiations and concessionaires’ performance.
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The Telebrás Privatization
The main goals underlying the privatization of Telebrás, as the government proclaimed,
were universality, competition and quality of telecom services.136 Earning the highest possible
price for Telebrás at the time of the sale was also among the government’s top priorities,
however, under investors’ perspective, this goal conflicts with the other three. For instance,
investors will pay more money for longer periods of exclusivity (this appears to have been one
factor in the Argentine case, for instance).
The government designed a plan with the following key features for privatization of
Telebrás: (i) institutional reform;137 (ii) regulatory body and competition;138 (iii) financial
restructuring;139 and (iv) the sale. Argentina’s plan had the same key features; however, they
were only partially implemented, or else, were neglected altogether during the ENTEL
negotiations.
Institutional reform. The Constitutional Amendment No. 8, of August 15, 1995, ended
the state monopoly over telecommunications services. The amendment, however, provided that
there should be a new law detailing the role of the state and the new principles governing the
telecom sector before the privatization. In July 16, 1997, the Brazilian Congress enacted the Lei
136 According to the World Bank’s Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, “universality” refers
generally to “universal access” and “universal service.” Universe access refers to a situation where every
person has a reasonable means of access to a publicly available telephone. Universal access may be
provided through pay telephones, community telephone centres, teleboutiques, community Internet access
terminals or similar means. The “universal services” concept refers to a policy focused on promoting or
maintaining “universal” availability of connections by individual households to public
telecommunications networks. Other important concept in assessing universality is “teledensity, which is
defined as the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. The concept of teledensity is closely
related to that of “penetration,” which is a measurement of access to telecommunications, normally
calculated by dividing the number of subscribers to a particular service by the population and multiplying
by 100. Definitions taken from Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, Appendix C, Glossary.
137 This reform included a constitutional amendment to change the role of the state in the telecom sector.
138 In Brazil this included setting the regulatory framework and establishing and regulating qualitative and
quantitative standards for the provision of telecom services after privatization.
139 Included eliminating cross-subsidies and rebalancing Telebrás’ cash flows.
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Geral das Telecomunicações (General Telecommunications Law, GTL, Law No. 9472), which
changed the role of the state from provider to regulator of telecommunications services. The law
also established the general principles that would govern the telecommunications sector,140
created the regulatory agency, Anatel, laid out the new structure of the telecommunications
sector and established the parameters for the restructuring and privatization of Telebrás.141
Regulatory body and competition. Besides determining that the telecom sector would be
open to competition after privatization, the GTL also outlined certain terms and conditions that
should be incorporated into all concession contracts to be signed with private owners after the
privatization. The law established that Anatel would be “administratively and financially
independent,” with most of its revenues deriving from fees paid by new private owners of
Telebrás. Scholar Armando Castelar Pinheiro states: “the most successful case of privatization
cum regulatory reform [in Brazil] is, undoubtedly, telecommunications…” because “…when
privatization took place, the entire regulatory structure was already established and the
regulatory agency responsible for the sector was functioning at full steam…” adding that “…the
new owners knew exactly what rules would be in force after privatization.”142 Pinheiro contrasts
this scenario with that of the Brazilian energy sector, where the regulatory agency, Aneel, was
only created two years after privatization. This tardiness, Pinheiro observes, curtailed the ability
of the regulatory body to operate and, as a result, Aneel enjoys “limited prestige in the eyes of
the public” and investors.143
140 The law reads: “Article 6. The telecommunications services shall be organized based on the principle
of free, ample and fair competition among all providers, having the Government to act towards promoting
them, as well as to correct the effects of imperfect competition and to repress violations against economic
order.”
141 Please see the full text of the General Telecommunications Law at Anatel’s webpage.
142 Pinheiro and Kukasaku (1999), p. 22.
143 Pinheiro and Kukasaku (1999), p. 23.
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The autonomy of Anatel contributed to imprint a sense of transparency and reliability
upon the institutional components of the new telecommunications sector. In fact, a case study by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) praises Anatel’s effectiveness by saying that
its autonomy increased regulatory responsiveness to the sector and investor confidence in the
transparency and fairness of the regulatory process in Brazil.144
A word is due here about the staffing and oversight of Anatel, to demonstrate how it was
stronger and more independent than Argentina’s regulator. Anatel enjoys independent legal
status and operates under the authority of the Head of State (the president, who appoints the
members of Anatel’s Board of Directors). However, the agency is connected to the Ministry of
Communications for the approval of its budget, and matters coming from the agency to the
president must first go through the Ministry. The oversight of Anatel is done through the
Advisory Council, which is comprised of representatives from society, and not affiliated with
Anatel. These include, but are not limited to, members of the Federal Senate, House of
Representatives, telecommunications services providers, consumer-protection groups and entities
representing society at large. Each segment of representatives is limited to having two members
in the 12-member Council; each member can only serve in the Council for three non-renewable
terms. Finally, Anatel was deemed an example of “regulatory independence and effectiveness”
in a survey conducted by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).145
Anatel started operating immediately after the enactment of the GTL. Among Anatel’s
first tasks was the drafting of a General Concessions Plan for telecommunications and a General
Universalization Plan (these two regulatory milestones still serve as the backbones of the
144 “Effective Regulation Case Study: Brazil 2001.” This case study may be accessed at
www.itu.int/itunews/issue/2001/10/effective.html.
145 The ITU is the United Nations body responsible for fostering telecommunications development and
services around the world. This quote taken from “Effective Regulation Case Study: Brazil 2001.” This
case study may be accessed at www.itu.int/itunews/issue/2001/10/effective.html.
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regulatory landscaper to date). The principles of the GTL, namely universality, competition and
quality, were at the core of the regulatory documents Anatel drafted. The General Concessions
Plan divided the country into four major concession areas and established that licenses to explore
telecommunications services, including those created by the privatization of Telebrás, would not
be exclusive. The Universalization Plan set forth quantitative and qualitative goals for the new
owners of Telebrás (the universalization goals), which also served as standards that should be
observed by post-privatization newcomers. These goals established numbers and a schedule for
private and public telephones to be installed throughout the country, and determined other
standards of quality for the services to be provided to consumers. The government’s diligence in
providing very detailed standards, which were in synchrony with the industry’s current trends
worldwide, helped lend credibility to Anatel’s management team and, as result, to the
privatization process as whole. In that way the government increased investors’ perception of its
credibility by making sure the rules of the game were known months before the public bid took
place.
To foster a competitive environment in the sector, the GTL divided telecommunications
into public and private regimes. Public and private regimes were simply operational definitions
the government used to delineate the market after privatization. Those companies being sold
during the privatization (i.e.: operating under license to use the old Telebrás system) were
deemed to be operating under the public regime; whereas the new companies receiving licenses
to operate and compete with the privatized companies were said to operate under the private
regime. The government announced, prior to the privatization, that it would authorize “mirror
companies”146 to enter and to operate in the market, under the private regime, immediately after
146 Companies that the state would authorize to operate in the telecommunications sector after
privatization under the private regime or the “restricted interest” services (GTL, Article 62).
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the privatization of Telebrás. In doing so, the government made clear to Telebrás’ buyers that
some type of competition would be initiated immediately after the privatization. The mirror
companies were required to submit proposals to Anatel complying with all goals and standards
established by the Universalization Plan. Antitrust regulation in the post-privatization
environment would be under the auspices of CADE,147 the antitrust regulatory agency in Brazil,
and Anatel should be informed, prior to settlement, of any merger or acquisition in the
telecommunications sector, including cross-country mergers.148
Financial restructuring. The Telebrás privatization required a much more complex
operation than ENTEL’s. ENTEL was an operational company; Telebrás was a holding
company. As such, its main role was to raise and transfer capital to its twenty-six subsidiaries,
distributed among the twenty-six Brazilian states, and to Embratel, its long distance and
international phone carrier.149 In fact, it is mainly because of this holding structure that an
inefficient tariff system and excessive cross-subsidies existed (the holding company would
switch revenue streams from more profitable subsidiaries to fund less profitable ones, all by
keeping below-cost prices).150 Because of this system, the subsidiaries’ cash flows were
147 Law No. 4,137 of September 10, 1962 created CADE. It was revamped and given the status of federal
independent agency (autarquia federal), acting under the Ministry of Justice pursuant to Law No. 8,884
of June, 1994.
148 The intention in regulating cross-border mergers was to avoid the so-called monopoly leveraging by
international partners. Monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm leverages its monopoly power by
designing a merger from one market onto another where it is subject to tighter competition, therefore
eliminating the possibility of newcomers. (See I. Vogelsang and B. Mitchell. Telecommunications
Competition – The Last Ten Miles (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) in José Claudio Linhares Pires and
Mauricio Serrão Piccinini. “A Regulação dos Setores de Infra-Estrutura no Brasil.” Papéis BNDES (in
Portuguese), pp. 217-260 (translation mine)
149 The federal government held 52.2 percent of the voting stock; 23 percent of the company’s total
capital; foreign investors held 27 percent of total capital (these numbers changed at the time of sale, to
51.79 percent of government-held voting stock; 19.26 percent of total capital; and 40 percent of total
capital held by foreign investors) in Ana Novaes. “The Privatization of the Brazilian Telecommunications
Sector.” BNDES Essays, February 2000.
150 In Argentina, international and long-distance calls were prices above-cost in order to fund below-cost
local calls.
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overestimated (i.e.: more cash was recorded than the subsidiary could actually generate by
operating under normal conditions), distorting the true financial condition of the system. It was
necessary to rebalance the system prior to the sale as to provide investors with a clear picture of
the subsidiaries’ operating conditions. A detailed explanation of this part of the transaction
involves complex financial and accounting concepts, and such discussion is outside the scope of
this paper. It suffices to say that the government informed investors and consumers of the new
organization of the Telebrás tariff system months before the privatization. Because the old tariff
system was notoriously not unrepresentative of the subsidiaries’ financial health, the impact of
restructuring the system on subsidiaries’ cash flows was a condition sine qua non for the
government to earn credibility before investors. Conversely, it would be reasonable to argue that
Argentina’s failure to re-balance ENTEL’s cash flows may have had a negative impact on
investors’ perceptions of its credibility.
The sale. The GTL allowed for any kind of corporate arrangement for the sale of
Telebrás (e.g., merger, spin-off, partial liquidation, etc.). The government’s advisors considered
three models for the sale of Telebrás: selling the government’s holdings directly to private
buyers, selling the subsidiaries and keeping the holding, and spinning off the Telebrás system
into several operating companies and privatizing thereafter. The spin-off151 model followed by
privatization was chosen because it allowed the government to break the current monopoly, and
not simply transform it into a private monopoly by selling the entire holding company to a single
buyer. This model also allowed for the government to boost the development of
telecommunications services in more economically underdeveloped areas of the country (for
151 Telebrás was spun-off into 12 companies; four wired telephone companies: Embratel Holding, Telesp,
Tele Norte-Leste, Tele Centro-Sul; and eight wireless (cellular) telephone companies: Telesp Celular,
Tele Sudeste Celular, Telemig Celular, Tele Sul Celular, Tele Nordeste Celular, Tele Centro-Oeste
Celular, Tele Norte Celular and Tele Leste Celular.
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instance, a company operating in São Paulo, the richest Brazilian state, would not be allowed to
explore the market in the South, the country’s second richest region). This strategy illustrates a
commitment to fostering competition and improving services across different regions of the
country after privatization.152 Figure 4Figure 4 illustrates the model used to spin-off Telebrás
into twelve companies.
[Insert Figure 4: Telebrás spin-off modelFigure 4: Telebrás spin-off model here]
On July 29, 1998, the twelve companies were sold in an auction at the Rio de Janeiro
Stock Exchange (please refer to Table 6Table 6 for a list of all members in each winning
consortium). Market analysts expected that the government would earn a premium of no more
than 40 percent of the value of the 19.26 percent (this was the government’s stake on sale (note
that Argentina privatized 60 percent of ENTEL in 1990).153 The government earned an
astounding 64.04 percent premium (over US$9 billion for the wired telephone companies; almost
US$7 billion for the cellular companies; and over US$2 billion for Embratel; the total
government earnings were almost US$20 billion).154 Table 4Table 4 shows the proceeds and
premiums earned in the Telebrás privatization (note that only the companies providing fixed
residential line services were considered in this analysis).
[Insert Table 4: Proceeds and Premium: Telebrás Privatization (in US$ million)Table 4:
Proceeds and Premium: Telebrás Privatization (in US$ million) here]
In early 1999, the telecom industry, as much as the rest of the economy, suffered from the
sharp currency depreciation, and a pattern of weak growth followed. Nevertheless, the Brazilian
telecom market was opened to full competition in January 2002, and today Brazil is, by far, the
152 Please see Novaes (2000), p. 11, for a detailed sketch of the structure of the spin-off operation.
153 Market analysts tend to agree that the premium paid for control of a company in the
telecommunications sector ranges between 35 and 45 percent (author’s conversations with market
analysts).





largest telecommunications market in Latin America. And in spite of the crisis of 1999, the
sector continued to grow and investments remained high. As illustrated by Figure 5: Teledensity
- Argentina and Brazil (actual and forecast)Figure 5: Teledensity - Argentina and Brazil (actual
and forecast), teledensity in Argentina is slightly higher than in Brazil, mainly because the sector
was privatized almost a decade earlier in that country, allowing for an earlier increase in number
of connections available. However, investment levels in Brazil are significantly higher than in
Argentina, as illustrated by Figure 6: Telecommunications Investments - Brazil and Argentina
(actual and forecast)Figure 6: Telecommunications Investments - Brazil and Argentina (actual
and forecast), suggesting that Brazil may offer a more favorable investment climate.155 Overall,
as per a market overview released by The Economist Business Intelligence Unit (June 2005) “the
telecom sector [in Brazil] experienced sharp growth since privatization…because of continuing
liberalization and the state encouragement of the development of new technologies.”156
An article in newspaper O Globo, September 12, 2005, citing a survey conducted that
same year by Ogilvy Brazil, states “…cellular phones and the internet are the products that
changed the lives of Brazilians the most in the past few years.” The last time such survey was
conducted was 1997, before the Telebrás privatization. A cellular phone was considered a
luxury item, and was desired by over 60 percent of those interviewed. In 2005, the survey
indicated that Brazilians in the classes D and E (lower-middle to low-income) generally asserted
that, “as everyone else [i.e.: those in upper classes], I can also have a cellular phone now.”157
155 For further details on investment levels, as well as other telecommunications indicators for both
Argentina and Brazil, please refer to Table 5: Selected Telecommunications Data - Argentina and
BrazilTable 5: Selected Telecommunications Data - Argentina and Brazil.
156 The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Telecommunications Industry Forecast, Americas,” June 2005, p.
27.
157 Cleide Carvalho. “Celular e internet mudaram a vida dos brasileiros.” O Globo, September 12, 2005.





Despite the fact that this thesis claims that the Brazilian government was more successful
in creating a perception of credibility, it should be highlighted, however, that perception does not
necessarily reflect reality. A corruption scandal surfaced shortly after the Telebrás privatization
involving the taping of phone conversations among top government officials; thus, the scandal
came to be known as the “Telebrás tape” case. The content of these tapes suggest that in the
Brazilian case, as in the Argentine case, there was some degree of secrecy and manipulation.
Top government officials implicated in the scandal resigned after the tapes became public (for
instance, the president of the National Bank for Social and Economic Development, BNDES).
BNDES is a federal government bank, and was heavily involved in the negotiations of the
Telebrás privatization. An article published by the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo
suggested that BNDES had favored the Telecom/Opportunity group, with the approval of
president Cardoso.158
Corruption scandals in connection with the telecommunications sector are making news
in Brazil to this date. The most recent developments involve a fiery dispute over the control of
Brasil Telecom (the controlling shareholder of Tele Centro-Sul), between Banco Opportunity
and its owner, banker Daniel Dantas, and Telecom Italia. Until recently, Daniel Dantas was the
controlling shareholder of Brasil Telecom, and Telecom Italia, the second major shareholder. In
2004, Carla Cico, then president of Brasil Telecom and who was appointed by Dantas, hired the
corporate espionage firm, Kroll Associates, to investigate the corporate activities of Telecom
Italia. Kroll’s work involved even the leaking of e-mails from Luis Gushiken, then Secretary of
Communication of Brazilian president, Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva. In April 2005, Dantas and
158 Folha de São Paulo, “Bank president submits resignation over telephone taping case.” May 25, 1999;
Brazilian Financial Wire. “Cardoso allegedly favored group in Telebrás auction.” May 25, 1999; Mario
de Almeida. “Telebrás auction yields bumper premiums, but at a cost.” Gazeta Mercantil Invest News,
Editorial Page, December 31, 1998.
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Cico were indicted for conspiracy, corruption and corporate espionage. Around the same time,
the Courts and Anatel determined that Opportunity could no longer be the controlling
shareholder of Brasil Telecom, and all directors on the board of Brasil Telecom that had been
appointed by Dantas were dismissed. Dantas and Opportunity are also involved in several
corruption scandals currently under investigation in Congress, involving the bribery of
Congressmen by the current Lula administration.159
As asserted earlier in this paper, it is crucial that we focus on the issue of how the two
privatization processes were perceived by investors. The narratives of the two transactions leave
little doubt that the Brazilian government was successful in establishing its credibility during the
process, more so than the Argentine government. Furthermore, an analysis of the measurable
variables outlined in Chapter I also confirms the hypothetical assertion. First, the institutional
reform carried out in Brazil followed the recommendations of NIE to create a positive
investment climate. That is, the government’s efforts emphasized a comprehensive institutional
reform by enacting laws that passed through Congress and the creation of a regulator prior to the
privatization. Congruent with NIE principles, all of these attributes contribute to lower
transactions costs and strengthen property rights. Furthermore, the Brazilian government was
able to attain a higher premium for Telebrás, and investors agreed upon a shorter exclusivity
period and significant performance targets to be reached after the privatization. Conversely, the
narrative of the ENTEL transaction leads us to believe that there was a great amount of
uncertainty embedded in the privatization process in Argentina. Congruent with my hypothesis,
the investment climate in Argentina appeared less than favorable to investors, and, as a
159 Noticias Terra. “Briga Entre Teles Envolve ate Espionagem” Terra – Noticias – Retrospectiva 2005.
December 8, 2005. Retrieved December 30, 2006 at
http://noticias.terra.com.br/retrospectiva2005/interna/0,,OI788617-EI5867,00.html.
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consequence of this perception, the Argentine government had its bargaining power greatly
diminished during the privatization.
It is quite evident, then, that Menem and his team committed mistakes while designing
the privatization. However, to demonstrate this by simply asserting that his actions ignited a
negative causal chain of events (i.e.: unstable institutional environment  low credibility  weak
bargaining power of the state  overall negative outcome) is a great historical insensitivity.
Argentina was going through a severe hyperinflationary crisis, and social unrest threatened the
very continuity of Menem’s presidency. Conversely, Cardoso faced what political scientists
refer to as “politics as usual.” Although his reform packages faced some opposition, Brazil was
going through a relatively stable economic period, with low inflation rates. This historical
context enhanced his ability to negotiate a reform with political actors.
It would appear, then, that a fair comparative assessment of the results of these
privatizations cannot be complete without bringing the historical context into the scope of
analysis. Congruent with the main claim by NIE scholars, issues such as political turmoil,
economic instability, and other historical conditions surrounding the privatization process, are as
important as classical economic rationale when it comes to explaining the outcomes of
privatization as a macroeconomic policy.
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
Assessing the hypothesis
The focus of this study is not whether privatization of telecommunications was good or
bad. Instead, this thesis looked at the ways in which a state can enhance its credibility (and
therefore its bargaining power) when privatizing, and how the choices involved in this process
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are influenced by the historical context. Specifically, this thesis compared and contrasted two
cases where investors’ perception of the state’s credibility played a major role in determining the
outcomes of privatization. Given the evidence presented in this paper, it is reasonable to argue
that the perceived flaws in the ENTEL privatization with respect to institutional quality had a
negative effect on the state’s bargaining power during the privatization process.
My hypothesis asserts that the gains the state (and potentially society at large) attain at
the time of privatization is directly related to the level of its bargaining power while negotiating
with investors, and that this power can be enhanced by the adoption of a stable and consistent
sector-wide institutional reform prior to privatization. The hypothesis appears to be valid
because the evidence presented herein shows that Argentina and Brazil differed markedly with
respect to the stability and consistency of institutions in connection with the privatization.
Consistent with the hypothesis, Brazil enjoyed greater bargaining power while negotiating with
investors given the results it obtained during the sale (higher premium and competition).
The hypothesis appears to be valid because the discussion offered in this paper lends
evidence to support the claim Argentina had, in comparison to Brazil, a more unpredictable and
unstable institutional environment. For example, Brazil created an active and independent
regulatory agency prior to the privatization and opened its market to partial competition
immediately after privatization
Furthermore, the measurable variables are better in Brazil than in Argentina. Brazil
received a greater premium for a stake of less than 20 percent in Telebrás, than did Argentina,
for a stake of 60 percent in ENTEL. More significant performance targets for the provision of
telecommunications services were agreed upon with investors in Brazil, than in Argentina.
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Finally, Argentina partially opened its market to new entrants in 1999 and full competition does
not yet exist.160
Lessons learned
There are at least two lessons to be derived from this investigation, and they touch upon
the concepts of institutional theory and economic history.
Institutional stability during the privatization enhances the state’s credibility during the
process, and, therefore, it may enhance the state’s bargaining power while negotiating with
investors. This lesson becomes even more relevant when we expand this assumption to say that
the state’s bargaining power is directly related to the benefits that privatization will bring to
society at large. Consider the Brazilian case, for instance. There, the government was able to
reconcile two seemingly conflicting goals (under the point of view of investors negotiating with
the government): attain a higher premium for its stake in Telebrás while granting minimal
exclusivity period to new owners. In the business world that is called “leverage.” So, the first
lesson may be summarized as follows: the benefits of privatization are directly related to the
state’s leverage during privatization negotiations, and leverage is directly related to the quality
and timing of the institutional reform the state carries out.
The second lesson to be derived from this study relates to the historical conditions
surrounding the privatization. Evidence from this investigation suggests that countries should
seek to eliminate critical problems, such as hyperinflation, before privatizing pivotal industries,
such as telecommunications. During acute crisis, as was the case in Argentina, it appears that the
state loses too much of its room to negotiate with investors. In other words, states will agree to
160 Business Monitor International Ltd., The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. “Argentina: Key
Economic Sectors Report, Argentina Q1 2005,” p. 26. See www.eiu.com.
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any proposition when there is a desperate need for cash, or debt relief, because the problem (i.e.:
privatization) needs to be solved quickly.
Brazil was going through an entirely different historical moment at the time of the
Telebrás privatization. There was not a feeling of imminent catastrophe as in the Argentina of
the late 1980s. Inflation was under control, and the country was experiencing relatively stable
GDP growth. It is worth noting that Brazil tried to implement an ambitious, yet unsuccessful,
privatization program in the early 1990s, under president Fernando Collor. Coincidently, at that
point, Brazil too was going through a severe inflationary crisis.
Thus, the second lesson may be summarized as follows: an analysis of an economic
policy such as privatization cannot be done detached from an analysis of the historical context.
In itself, privatization cannot be assessed as a good or bad policy since its outcomes will depend
on the institutional design created to implement it – and, the institutional design, as shown in this
study, is markedly influenced by political turmoil, economic instability and other historical
conditions.
Relevance of NIE
It appears that even sound economic policies (i.e.: privatization) cannot escape being
influenced by the historical context of a country because different historical realities will trigger,
or require, different implementation strategies from policy makers. The significance of this
assertion relies on the fact that NIE brings the historical and political zeitgeists to the core of the
economic analysis. Historically, neo-classical economists have pushed other social sciences
away from its scope of analysis, and addressed only what they consider an all-encompassing,
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self-sufficient entity, the markets.161 However, many authors have suggested that neo-classical
economics may not be sufficient to inform the formulation policies for decaying or
underdeveloped economic systems.162 To let the “invisible hand” work its wonders is certainly
the goal of liberal economic reforms. But while a free and developed market is a destination, the
road to get there needs to be paved with the right institutional framework, especially in Latin
America. NIE is an attempt to understand just what kind of institutions may work best to
facilitate economic development. To that end, NIE reaches outside the realm of economics and
brings other social sciences back into the analysis. This dialogue between economics and other
bodies of knowledge (i.e.: history, political science, psychology, etc) should be welcomed (how
well this dialogue is undertaken is another matter altogether).
As I hope this study has suggested, the success of liberal economic policies in developing
countries cannot be assessed on the basis of pure neo-classical economic rationale and without
bringing history and politics into the picture. Here is where the relevance of NIE for the study of
Latin America’s economic development resides.
161 K. William Kapp. “The Nature and Significance of Institutional Economics.” KYKLOS, Vol. 29, Fasc.
209-232, 1976.
162 Kapp (1976), pp. 210-11.
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Source: Gartner Dataquest (retrieved from RDS Table Base database)
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Figure 2: Hypothetical scheme
“Perceived” credibility of the state
(how investors generally perceive the overall
process to be)
Stronger bargaining power of the state
(privatizing state was able to reconcile
conflicting goals – e.g.: higher prices and
shorter exclusivity period)
Optimal outcome
(higher premiums, competition – i.e. shorter
exclusivity period; higher performance
targets)
Stable institutional environment
(“better” institutional reform, according to
general recommendations; laws, instead of
decrees; rules do not change arbitrarily, rules
are not conflicting within themselves)
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Figure 3: ENTEL sale model
Northern
60% Competitive bid
25% Public stock offer
5% Telephone cooperatives
10% ENTEL employees
* Min. cash portion of payment for 60% stake:
US$100 million






25% Public stock offer
5% Telephone cooperatives
10% ENTEL employees
* Min. cash portion of payment for 60% stake:
US$114 million
* Level of corporate debt to be assumed by new
owners: US$202 million
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Stake in the total capital of the subsidiary company = 19.8%
Stake held by the public in the total capital of the subsidiary company = 81.2%
This diagram was taken from Ana Novaes, The Privatization of the Brazilian Telecommunications Sector.
SIMAO 81
Figure 5: Teledensity - Argentina and Brazil (actual and forecast)

































































Figure 6: Telecommunications Investments - Brazil and Argentina (actual and forecast)



















































Table 1: Growth of Public Sector in Argentina and Brazil
Public Sector Spending
Estimate share Public Sector
as % of GDP of which PEs* (%) of PEs in GDP (%) Deficit as % of GDP
1970 1982 1970 1982 1978-80 1970 1982
Argentina 33 35 11 12 20 1 14
Brazil 28 32 6 11 39 2 17
Source: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Latin American Debt. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press/
Twentieth Century Fund, 1988, 54; in Manzetti, 1999.
* PEs: Public enterprises
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Table 2: Latin America and the Caribbean: External Debt, 1970-1985
Year Total Debt Debt from Official Sources* Debt from Private Sources
(billions of dollars) (billions of dollars) (as a % of total debt) (billions of dollars) (as a % of total debt)
1970 23 8 36 15 65
1971 26 9 36 17 65
1972 30 10 34 20 67
1973 40 12 28 28 70
1974 56 14 25 42 75
1975 75 16 22 59 79
1976 98 18 18 80 82
1977 116 21 18 95 82
1978 151 25 16 127 84
1979 182 27 15 157 86
1980 223 31 14 198 89
1981 278 34 12 246 88
1982 318 40 12 278 87
1983 344 51 15 293 85
1984 360 57 16 303 84
1985 368 65 18 303 82
* Official Sources mean the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, etc
Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, The Problem of the External Debt: Gestation,
Development, Crisis, and Prospects , March 6, 1986, Table 4, 8; Robert A. Pastor, 8.
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Northern ENTEL Telecom Italia 100 178 2,117 2,395
Southern ENTEL Telefonica 114 202 2,503 2,819
214 380 4,620 5,214





* Cash+corporate debt+Floor amount of sovereign debt required by government, for both companies.
** The premium serves to show how much more than the minimum price was the government able
to attain at the time of sale. It is a good measure of barganing power because it demonstrates
a high level of competition among investors to buy the state enterprise.
Premium=(Proceeds - Min Price/Min. Price)*100
Source: World Bank Privatization Database. Table compiled by author.
Winning ConsortiumOperating Company
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Table 4: Proceeds and Premium: Telebrás Privatization (in US$ million)





Embratel Participacoes S.A. MCI 1,548 2,276 47.03%
Tele Centro Sul Participacoes S.A. Telecom Italia 1,677 1,778 6.02%






Telesp Participacoes S.A. Telefonica 3,028 4,967 64.04%
* Source: Ana Novaes, "The Privatization of the Brazilian Telecommunications Sector," 23. Table compiled by
author.
** Source: World Bank Privatization Database. Table compiled by author.
Operating Company Winning Consortium
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Table 5: Selected Telecommunications Data - Argentina and Brazil
ARGENTINA Actual Forecast
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Telephone main lines ('000) 7,594 7,739 8,413 8,713 8,263 8,194 8,535 8,814 9,011 9,167 9,309 9,429
Telephone main lines (per 100
inhabitants) 21.0 21.2 22.8 23.3 21.9 21.4 22.1 22.6 22.8 23.0 23.1 23.2
Phone sets ('000) 12,795 13,116 14,039 14,176 14,184 14,212 14,726 15,731 16,742 17,587 18,474 19,407
Mobile subscribers ('000) 2,728 4,401 6,460 6,637 6,346 7,376 11,488 13,622 14,724 15,386 15,771 15,952
Mobile subscribers (per 100 inhabitants) 7.6 12.0 17.5 17.8 16.8 19.3 29.7 34.9 37.3 38.6 39.1 39.2
Internet users ('000) 518 929 2,193 3,473 3,619 4,148 5,124 6,284 7,214 7,779 8,330 8,849
Internet users (per 100 inhabitants) 1.4 2.5 5.9 9.3 9.6 10.8 13.3 16.1 18.3 19.5 20.7 21.7
Personal computers (stock per 1,000
inhabitants) 44.0 48.0 74.0 87.0 100.0 105.0 111.0 117.0 125.0 130.0 133.0 135.0
Telecommunications investments (US$
m) 810 551 878 1,483 3,245 2,336 2,512 2,480 2,298 2,299 2,299 2,299
BRAZIL Actual Forecast
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Telephone main lines ('000) 17,661 22,159 27,577 34,198 35,624 35,989 36,049 36,242 36,416 36,581 36,732 36,903
Telephone main lines (per 100
inhabitants) 10.7 13.2 16.2 19.8 20.4 20.3 20.1 20.0 19.8 19.7 19.5 19.4
Phone sets ('000) 25,961 32,187 39,995 49,601 52,506 55,420 58,082 61,082 63,528 65,628 67,798 70,039
Mobile subscribers ('000) 7,422 14,893 23,110 25,490 34,641 46,036 65,452 77,369 84,192 88,641 91,743 93,811
Mobile subscribers (per 100 inhabitants) 4.5 8.9 13.6 16.5 19.8 26.0 36.5 42.6 45.8 47.7 48.7 49.2
Internet users ('000) 3,384 4,479 8,032 10,815 13,820 16,867 20,032 22,673 24,712 26,429 27,911 29,165
Internet users (per 100 inhabitants) 2.0 2.7 4.7 6.3 7.9 9.5 11.2 12.5 13.5 14.2 14.8 15.3
Personal computers (stock per 1,000
inhabitants) 26.0 42.0 53.0 87.0 97.0 120.0 135.0 147.0 157.0 165.0 172.0 182.0
Telecommunications investments (US$
m) 3,435 5,261 6,882 9,221 4,336 4,240 3,952 4,500 4,142 3,267 2,578 2,033
Source: Pyramid Research; Economist
Intelligence Unit
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Table 6: Membership of the winning consortia - Argentina and Brazil
ARGENTINA
TELEFONICA - Shareholding in Cointel consortium TELECOM - Shareholding in Nortel consortium
Investor % Ownership Investor % Ownership
CVC (Citicorp Venture Capital) 20.00% STET 32.50%
Banco Rio de la Plata S.A. 15.26% France Cables 32.50%
Telefonica International 10.13% Perez Companc 25.00%
Inversora Catalinas 8.13% J.P. Morgan 9.75%
Banco Central de Espana S.A. 7.04% Morgan Capital Corporation 0.25%
Sociedad Comercial del Plata S.A. 5.14%
Banco Hispano Americano S.A. 5.00%
Telarg Investment Corp. 4.33%
Southtel Equity Corporation 4.22%
Zurich Ltd. 4.16%
The Bank of Tokyo Limited 4.16%
The Bank of New York 4.16%
Other investors* 7.99%
* No one of which owns 4.16 or more.
Source: Hill and Abdala
BRAZIL
TELEFONICA - Telesp Part. (major shareholders) TELEMAR - Tele Norte-Leste Part.
Investor % Ownership Investor % Ownership
Telefonica 63.00% BNDESPar 25.00%
Portugal Telecom 23.00% Fiago 19.90%
Bilbao Vizcaya 7.00% Andrade Gutierrez 11.30%
Other investors (RBS, Iberdrola) 7.00% Macal 11.30%
Inepar 11.30%
TELECOM - Tele Centro-Sul Part. La Fonte 11.00%
Investor % Ownership Alianca do Brasil 5.00%
Timepart (Citibank, Telecom) 62.00% Brasil Veiculos 5.00%
STET 19.00%
Techold (Opportunity, and investment 19.00% EMBRATEL
funds managed by Opportunity) Investor % Ownership
MCI 100.00%
Source: Pesquisa da BNDESPAR: Telecomunicacoes no Brasil (doc#3478, dated , January 5, 2000); document viewed
at BNDES' library in Rio de Janeiro, on January 2000.
** All tables compiled by author.
